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Leniency in Chinese Criminal Law?
Everyday Justice in Henan
Benjamin L. Liebman*
This Article examines one year of publicly available
criminaljudgments from a basic-level rural county court and
an intermediate court in Henan Province in order to better
understandtrends in routine criminal adjudicationin China. I
present an account of ordinary criminaljustice in China that
is both familiar and striking: a system that treats serious
crimes, in particular those affecting State interests, harshly,
while at the same time acting leniently in routine cases. Most
significantly, examination of more than five hundred court
decisions shows the vital role that settlement plays in criminal
cases in China today. Defendants who agree to compensate
their victims receive strikingly lighter sentences than those
who do not. Likewise, settlement plays a role in resolving even
serious crimes, at times appearing to make the difference
between life and death for criminaldefendants. My account of
ordinary cases in China contrastswith most Western accounts
of the Chinese criminal justice system, which focus on
sensational cases of injustice and the prevalence of harsh
punishments.
The evidence I present provides insight into the roles
being played by the Chinese criminaljustice system and the
functions of courts in that system. This Article also provides
empirical evidence that contributes to debates on a range of
other issues, including the relationship of formal law to
community norms in Chinese criminal justice, the roles of
witnesses and lawyers, the function of appellate review, and
how the system confronts and handles a range of high-profile
topics. My findings also contribute to literature on courts in
authoritarian regimes and the evolution of authoritarian
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transparency. This Article provides a base for discussing the
future of empirical research on Chinese court judgments,
demonstrating that there is much to learn from the volume of
cases that have recently become publicly available in China.
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INTRODUCTION

English-language scholarship on the Chinese criminal justice system
largely focuses on major cases and harsh punishments: "strike hard" campaigns,
capital cases, torture, and sensational cases of wrongful convictions. With few
exceptions, the term "leniency" rarely factors into Western accounts of criminal
justice in China. When it does, it is principally in the discussion of national
policies embracing the combination of leniency and harsh punishment, kuanyan
xiangfi, or leniency for those who confess, rather than empirical study of court
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practices.1 In contrast, this Article shows that leniency is a key characteristic of
everyday Chinese criminal justice, particularly in rural areas.
This Article examines one year of publicly available criminal judgments
from a basic-level county court and an intermediate court in Henan Province in
order to better understand criminal justice in rural China and in small towns and
mid-sized cities of the country. I supplement my analysis of cases with
interviews of judges, academics, and lawyers in Henan. I have two primary
goals. The first is to develop an understanding of trends in basic-level criminal
adjudication in China. I aim to paint a picture of what ordinary crime and
criminal justice looks like in one county and one municipality 2 in China. What
emerges is an account of ordinary criminal justice in China that is both familiar
and striking: a system that treats serious crimes, in particular those affecting
State interests, harshly, while at the same time practicing leniency in more
routine cases. Most significantly, examination of more than five hundred court
decisions shows the vital role that settlement plays in Chinese criminal cases
today. Defendants who agree to compensate their victims receive strikingly
lighter sentences than those who do not. Whether or not a settlement has been
reached is far more important to the resolution of a case than more traditional
legal factors, including legal arguments and evidence presented. Although the
importance of settlement has been noted in prior Chinese language scholarship,
no prior work has examined the practice through the study of court dockets or a
large volume of case decisions. 3 My dataset also allows me to examine the role
of intermediate courts in trying major crimes and in reviewing appeals from
lower courts. 4 Again, the findings are surprising. Appellate courts are far more

1. See, e.g., Susan Trevaskes, The Death Penalty in China Today: Kill Fewer, Kill
Cautiously, 48 ASIAN SURV. 393, 399 (2008) (describing the creation of the "balancing leniency and
severity" policy).
2. In China the municipality, or shi, is the primary subprovincial governance unit. A
municipality generally includes both extensive rural areas and county towns, administered by county
governments, and urban areas, administered by district governments.
3. The most detailed and important prior work in English on the Chinese criminal justice
system looks at a selection of cases from a range of different courts but does not examine every case
from any individual jurisdiction. See MIKE MCCONVILLE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CHINA: AN
EMPIRICAL INQUIRY 40 (2011).

4. China's court system is divided into four tiers: basic courts at the county (in rural areas) or
district (in urban areas) level, intermediate courts at the municipality level, provincial high courts,
and the Supreme People's Court. The vast majority of cases are tried in basic-level courts, with a
right to a single appeal to an intermediate court. But serious cases, including criminal cases in which
a defendant faces a potential death sentence or life imprisonment, are tried in intermediate courts
with a single appeal to the provincial high court. The State is represented by the procuratorate in
criminal cases. The procuratorate may appeal verdicts in criminal cases regardless of the outcome in
the first-instance court; there is no bar to the procuratorate appealing nonguilty verdicts or to arguing
that a lower court was too lenient toward a defendant. Decisions become final after a decision on
appeal is issued (or after the time for an appeal has expired). But courts may also decide to retry
cases at a later date through retrial (zaishen) procedures. Courts also must retry a case if requested to
do so by the procuratorate. Litigants may request a rehearing within two years of a final decision.
There is no time limit on rehearings initiated by the courts or procuratorates. In practice this means
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aggressive in policing lower-court judgments than is commonly assumed.
Likewise, settlement plays a role in resolving even serious crimes, at times
appearing to make the difference between life and death for criminal defendants.
My second goal is methodological. Until recently, Chinese criminal
judgments were either difficult or impossible to obtain, especially for nonChinese researchers. Those who did obtain such opinions largely relied on
friends and colleagues with connections to local courts. Within the span of just a
few years this situation has changed dramatically: in Henan Province alone, tens
of thousands of criminal judgments are now available online. In 2013, China's
Supreme People's Court (SPC) called on courts nationwide to follow the Henan
example and place most judgments online. 5 The reasons behind this sudden
embrace of transparency are complex (and certainly do not include facilitating
research by scholars, Chinese or foreign). Nevertheless, the widespread
availability of large volumes of criminal judgments raises the question of what
can actually be learned from reading court opinions in China. Chinese and
Western scholars have generally assumed Chinese criminal judgments tell us
very little about either the facts or reasoning behind a case. To be sure, much is
missing from these decisions. The task of reading contemporary criminal
judgments is at times akin to reading Qing Dynasty cases: readers are left to
speculate about the facts of the case and behind the scenes interactions among
the courts, the procuratorate, and the police. Cases are written in a standard
format and generally emphasize outcomes, not analysis. Certain cases, most
notably death sentences, remain unavailable and we know little about those that
are not made public. Nevertheless, this Article demonstrates there is much to
learn from publicly available cases, including about the role of settlement, the
types of sentences imposed, the legal arguments made, and the roles of lawyers.
Even relatively minor and simple case decisions generally provide information
about the defendant, the crime charged, alleged facts, evidence, lawyer and
procuratorate attendance and arguments, and outcome, including fines and
sentences. This Article is the first step toward exploring what scholars can learn
from the huge volume of material now publicly available.
The evidence I present provides insight into the roles being played by the
Chinese criminal justice system, the functions courts play in that system, and the
meaning of leniency in Chinese criminal practice. My findings also offer a
baseline for evaluating future changes to the Chinese criminal justice system, in
particular the effect of the 2012 revisions to the Criminal Procedure Law, 6 the

that after the two-year period has run litigants seeking to reopen cases protest or petition to courts or
procuratorates in an attempt to convince them to initiate rehearings.
5. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zai Hulianwang Gongbu Caipan
) [Provisions of the
1VK4>
Wenshu De Guiding (MiAA
Supreme People's Court on the Issuance of Judgments on the Internet by the People's Courts]
(promulgated by Sup. People's Ct., Nov. 21, 2013, effective Jan.1, 2014), available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2013/11/id/147242.shtml (China).
6. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa ( 1'0X
OI j$i8tiiA) [Criminal
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most important development in Chinese criminal justice in two decades, as well
as the effect of major personnel shifts in the wake of the 2012 leadership
transition.7 The evidence I present also adds to debates on a range of other
issues, such as the relationship of formal law to community norms in Chinese
criminal justice, the role of witnesses and lawyers, and how the criminal justice
system confronts and handles a range of controversial topics, including land
disputes, corruption, protests, and disputes within families.
This Article also contributes to the literature on the evolution of China's
courts and courts in authoritarian regimes. The emphasis that courts,
procuratorates, and police place on settling cases reflects trends in the Chinese
legal system away from formal adjudication in favor of mediated outcomes. Carl
Minzner has described such developments as a "turn against law." 8 I have
written of China's "return to populist legality." 9 In criminal cases, concerns
about stability often lead to surprisingly lenient outcomes, at least in routine
cases. As in high-profile civil disputes-most notably medical, labor, and land
cases-extreme State emphasis on social stability is leading courts to innovate
in routine cases. Although judges generally claim they are lenient only where
formally permitted by law, some cases represent quite flexible interpretations of
existing law. Courts are most concerned with defending themselves from
criticism, minimizing conflicts with other State actors, and reducing the risk of
petitions and protest. 10 Such concerns explain both emphasis on settlements and
deference to procuratorates. Evidence from Henan also contributes to literature
on the role of transparency in the Chinese legal and political system and in
authoritarian systems more generally. Henan's experiment with judicial
transparency is an example of the ways in which increased public exposure may
be used primarily to serve the interests of centralized State oversight and
control.
In Part I of this Article I discuss Henan's efforts to make court decisions
publicly available. In Part II, I present my empirical findings based on
examination of one year of publicly available criminal division decisions from
Procedure Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 14, 2012),
available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2012-03/17/content 2094354.htm (amending Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa (
tI 9Thif t Vt [Criminal Procedure Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Jul. 1, 1997),
available at http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-corruptioninitiative/46814279.pdf) [hereinafter
Criminal Procedure Law]. I refer to the 1996 version of the law as the "1996 Criminal Procedure
Law" and to the 2012 version of the law as the "2012 Criminal Procedure Law."
7. The leadership transition included the installation of new leaders of the courts,
procuratorates, and the Communist Party's Political Legal Committee, which oversees the entire
legal system.
8.
Carl Minzner, China'sTurn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 937 (2011).
9.

Benjamin Liebman, A Return to PopulistLegality: HistoricalLegacies and Legal Reform,

in MAO'S INVISIBLE HAND 165 (Elizabeth Perry & Sebastian Heilmann eds., 2011).
10.
See generally Benjamin Liebman, A Populist Threat to China's Courts? in CHINESE
JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 269 (Margaret Y. K. Woo & Mary

E. Gallagher eds., 2011).
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one county court and one intermediate court. In Part III, I discuss the
methodological significance of the large amount of data only recently made
available in China, the implications of my empirical findings for literature on the
Chinese criminal justice system, and on courts and transparency in authoritarian
regimes.
I.
BACKGROUND: HENAN'S PUSH TOWARD "JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY"

Henan Province is home to roughly 100 million people. Located in central
China and regarded as the historical birthplace of Chinese civilization, Henan
has lagged behind many eastern and central provinces economically: its per
capita GDP ranks twenty-first out of thirty-three provincial units in China (not
including Taiwan). 11 Henan is divided into seventeen municipalities, each
administering populations that range from 1.5 to 8.5 million people. With 61
million classified as rural, Henan is home to the largest rural population in
China. 12
Beginning in mid-2009, the Henan High People's Court ordered all courts
in the province to begin putting most decisions online. 13 Although Chinese law
provides for most court decisions to be made publicly available, in general they
are not readily available to nonlitigants. The Henan High Court rule came in the
wake of Supreme People's Court (SPC) statements that courts should embrace

11.

Comparing

Chinese

Provinces

with

Countries,

THE

ECONOMIST,

http://www.econoinist.com/content/chineseequivalents (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
12. Wang Keya (jtili), Henan Sheng Nongcun Renkou Liudong Ji Qi Dui Liuchu Di Jingfi
Fazhan De Yingxiang Yanjiu (MStttkWfi@ttX
ffS
000fY ) [Henan Rural

f4

)

ff6t0h

Population Flows and Their Economic Development Impact Study], HENAN DAXUE (7
[HENAN UNIVERSITY] (2009), available at http://wenku.baidu.com/view/a81c65c22cc58bd63186bd

14i 1K

I

:E iff 0A

79.html?re=view..
13. Related notices stated that the policy was being implemented in order to make the courts
more convenient for the people" and to improve "communication with the people." See Henan
Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Qingkuang Tongbao ( 4 -Ai$
#i L1 4Z
1I
±AME , MA T)
[Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court Judgments on the Internet] (promulgated
by the Henan High People's Ct., Nov. 5, 2011), availableat http://www.hncourt.org/public/detail.ph
p?id=91015; see also Guanyu Renzhen Zuohao Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Gongzuo de Tongzhi
A the
Th f
AX
Z
) [Notice on How To Diligently (tR
Accomplish
Work of Publishing Court Judgments on the Internet] (promulgated by the Sanmenxia Ct., May 11,
2009), available at http://smxzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=369; Henan Sheng Gaoji
Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yingfa Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Gongbu Guanli Banfa De Tongzhi ( I

~ K(~it~tIAA& Th~Lt~flMt5M)[Henan

Provincial High Court's Notice on Printing and Distributing Court Judgment Publication Online
Management Measures] (promulgated by the Henan High People's Ct., Feb. 22, 2010), available at
http://gsxfy.hncourt.org/public/detail.php?id=356,;%/20; Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Caipan
Wenshu Shangwang Guanli Shishi Xize (4 - W A&MIR
IA [ t Af 1 M lH l A
)!1 ) [Implementing Rules of Henan Provincial High Court for the Management of Online Publication
of Judgments] (promulgated by the Henan High People's Ct., Aug. 12, 2011), available at
http://jfqfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=569 [hereinafter Implementing Rules].
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transparency and place cases online, 14 yet Henan's efforts to post cases went
beyond what had been done in other provinces and regions up to that point. 15
Other courts had placed cases online selectively, or, in some instances, had
placed all cases from a specific court division online. In contrast, the
presumption in Henan is that all cases are to be posted online unless they fall
within specified exceptions. 16
The official Henan policy is that all court decisions formally classified as
judgments or verdicts, panjue shu, are to be posted online. 17 Documents
classified as rulings, caiding shu, which are typically brief decisions, are
required to be posted online only if they fit into one of eight categories,
generally those involving substantive rulings. 18 Exceptions to the general rule
include cases involving State secrets, personal privacy issues, business secrets,
crimes committed by juveniles and other cases not publicly tried, capital cases,
State compensation cases, mediated cases, and withdrawn cases. 19 Litigants may
also request that cases not be posted online or be removed after posting. 20 The
rules state that a court may grant such a request only after "strict review" by a
supervising judge and only if the case is deemed likely to cause emotional
distress to a litigant or third party. In practice this is most often done in a broad

14. The SPC's regulation was permissive, not mandatory. It stated in relevant part that "the
people's courts may, according to the needs of legal advocacy, law research, case guidance and
unification of standards for judgment, compile, print and publish various judgment documents in a
centralized way." See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yingfa Guanyu Sifa Gongkai de Liuxiang Guiding He
Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Jieshou Xinwen Meiti Yulun Jiandu De Ruogan Guiding de Tongzhi

)) Oii b) [Supreme People's Court's Notice on the Publication of Six Measures on Judicial
Openness and Certain Provisions on People's Court Accepting News Media Supervision]
(promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 8, 2009), available at http://www.lawlib.com/law/law view.asp?id=305059.
15. Some other provinces and municipalities began to emulate the Henan example.
16. In 2013 the SPC issued new rules calling for courts nationwide to place more opinions
online. See Zuigao Fa Shouci Shangwang Shai"Caipan Wenshu (Ri&L7EJ'
"
#14CA)
[Supreme Law for the First Time Puts Judgment Documents Online], RENMIN RIBAO (A.KE%

[PEOPLE] (Jul. 3, 2013), http://legal.people.com.cn/n/2013/0703/c42510-22054836.html.
17. Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 3, 5, 6 (stating that "all first instance, appeal, and
rehearing case opinions shall be posted online" with the exception of specific listed categories of
cases).
18. The implementing rules list eight categories of such rulings that must be posted online:
rulings affirming decisions in criminal cases, rulings refusing to accept a case, rulings reflecting
differing opinions on jurisdiction, rulings directly rejecting suits or rehearing decisions, rulings
remanding a case for retrial, rulings in cases involving disputes concerning enforcement, rulings
regarding appeals of enforcement decisions, and rulings correcting typographical errors in opinions.
Implementing Rules, supra note 13. More routine and nonsubstantive court notices and decisions are
excluded. Interview 2012-24.
19. Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 5.
20. Interview 2012-24; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 16. The Rules state that cases
may be removed if a party makes a valid request or a serious error is discovered, but only after
formal review by senior officials at the court that posted the decision. The rules appear designed to
prevent individual judges from removing cases that they do not want made public.
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range of family law disputes. 2 1 By contrast, no exception is made for criminal
cases; a defendant has no right to request a case not be made public or be
removed after it is posted online. 22 Certain information is redacted: victim and
witness names are removed prior to publication, as are parties' phone numbers
and addresses. 23
The exceptions leave significant room for local court interpretation.
Nevertheless, the policy is designed to require posting most cases online.
Provincial high court rules state that judges who believe a case should not be
placed online must seek approval from a court vice-president; otherwise, all
cases must be submitted for online posting at most three days after judgment is
handed to the parties. Cases submitted for online posting are reviewed by a court
official responsible for the website who has an additional three days to decide
whether or not to make the case publicly available. 24
As of early 2013, the Henan High Court reported that more than 440,000
cases had been posted online since the policy was adopted in 2009.25 By early
2014, that number had increased to more than 600,000.26 Although official

21.

Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 6, 7. The regulations state

that legitimate reasons for granting such a request include cases in which "there is strong
antagonism" among the parties or between one party and the court or the contents of an opinion may
cause "emotional pressure or negative effects" to a litigant or third party. The rules list certain
categories of cases likely to have such an effect: those involving reputation rights, disputes among
neighbors, divorce cases, claims concerning care for the elderly, inheritance disputes and those likely
to "intensify contradictions."
22. Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 6, 7.
23. Interview 2012-24; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 22. The Implementing Rules
state that victims' names are to be excluded only in cases involving violent crimes. In practice it
appears that victims' names are redacted in all cases. The Rules state that full names, gender, and
age of parties is to be included, but all other information is to be redacted. See also id. art. 21 (stating
that witnesses, juveniles, and those performing meritorious conduct such as helping to arrest a
defendant shall be listed only by last name).
24. Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 10, 11. The Rules state that
the presiding judge has three days from receiving confirmation that the decision has been delivered
to the parties, or from the end of the stipulated time for delivery, to submit the judgment for posting.
If the judge responsible for posting cases decides not to place a decision online she or he must
provide a specific reason for such a decision
25.

Henan Sanji Fayuan Shangwang Gongkai Caipan Wenshu Yu 44 Wan Jian (T4h jR
3f V4
1i
4 4 h ft) [Henan Three Levels of Courts Have PublishedMore than
440,000 Cases Online], RENMIN FAYUAN PINDAO (). [ 1
L6) [PEOPLE'S COURT CHANNEL]

-±M

f

(Jan. 25, 2013), http://court.gmw.cn/html/article/201301/25/117953.shtml. The figure was 280,000
as of early 2012; Interview 2012-24; see also Henan Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang 28 Wan Yu
Fen (4 -A$ [
#I Z 4 ± M 2 8 h
f1') [More Than 280, 000 Henan Court Judgment Are
Available Online], CAIXIN WANG (UM MA) [ECONOMIC NEWS NET] (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://china.caixin.com/2012-01-31/100352036.html.
26.
Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Gongzuo Baogao (k@k1
I1IflEA)
[Henan High People's Court Work Report], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG ( 1AJt) [CHINA
COURT WEB] (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/01/id/1205214.shtml;
see also interview 2014-1.
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reports claim Henan courts now put ninety-nine percent of their cases online, 27
this figure refers to cases outside the exceptions. In practice, a significant
percentage of court rulings are not posted online: for example, court-approved
mediation agreements, which represent a large portion of all first-instance civil
cases. 28
Initially, cases posted online were not permanently made public. Court
rules stated that cases should be public for one year, and in the initial years of
the policy courts generally removed cases from their websites at the end of the
calendar year. As judges explained, the primary goals of making cases publicly
available are "to make courts transparent," 2 9 to increase public confidence in the
courts, and to increase pressure on judges to decide cases correctly. 30 These
goals are achieved with the publication of cases for one year. In practice,
however, many such cases remain available in commercial case databases even
after they have been removed from court websites. The policy also appears to be
evolving toward permanent publication of cases. In 2012, the Henan High Court
began aggregating all cases province-wide onto its own website, with cases no
31
longer being removed after one year.
The decision to place cases online came in the wake of a number of highprofile wrongful convictions in Henan. Zhang Liyong, the president of the
Henan High People's Court, stated that the policy of placing opinions online
was "compelled" by the illegal conduct of some judges. Zhang stated that with
online publication, errors by judges will be "immediately discovered and
criticized online." 32 Judges now know that any errors will directly affect their

27.

One

report

from

late

2011

JudicialReform in Henan Gets Public Support,

put

PEOPLE'S

the
DAILY

figure

at

ONLINE,

99.37%.
Dec.

12,

See
2011,

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/102774/7674038.html.
28. Interview 2012-24; Henan Provincial High Court's Notice on Printing and Distributing
Court Judgment Publication Online Measures, supra note 13, art. 4.
29. Interview 2012-13.
30. Interview 2012-24; see also Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court
Judgments on the Internet, supra note 13.
31.
Henan
Kaitong
Caipan
Wenshu
Wang
He
Tingshen
Zhibo
Wang
(M J~ih4I11ASRIftU4fijT I)
[Henan Launches Case Website and Trial Live-Streaming
Website], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG ( rPRMM) [CHINA COURT WEB] (May 17, 2012),

http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2012/05/id/517955.shtml.
32.

See

Henan Fayuan Jiang Caipan Wenshu Shangwang "Daobi" Faguan Jinze
'lfii"
'fArf) [Online Publication of Judgments Forces Judges to be
ZHONGGUO
WANG
(' [A F)
[CHINA
NET]
(Jan.
25,
2009),

(411As bit"

Responsible],

http://www.china.com.cn/law/txt/2009-01/25/content_17185088.htm;
see also Notice on the
Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court Judgments on the Internet, supra note 13 (commenting
that online publications of judgments have offered judges an opportunity to study precedents and
narrow the discrepancy and randomness among judgments). Implicit in Zhang's comment was the
argument that erroneous outcomes in criminal cases are the fault of the courts. In practice, however,
it seems clear that many errors in criminal cases result from mistakes or misconduct by the police
and procuratorates and the courts' subsequent inability or unwillingness to challenge such mistakes.
I discuss this phenomenon in the context of one high-profile Henan case elsewhere. See Benjamin
Liebman, Professionalsand Populists: The Paradoxes of China'sLegal Reforms, in CHINA IN AND
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chances of promotion. Placing cases online is not intended to facilitate use of the
decisions in future cases or to serve as precedent. 33 Nevertheless, judges
acknowledge that lawyers often use prior cases in legal arguments. 34
Local courts in Henan vary in their implementation of the policy. Some
courts have taken more restrictive approaches to access than suggested by the
provincial high court, for example by not posting cases that have been
appealed. 35 Some jurisdictions appear to have liberal definitions of privacy
interests, and thus keep a larger percentage of cases from being posted. Yet a
number of courts also report "100 percent compliance" with the high court's
rules-meaning that they have posted all cases that do not come within a listed
exception. 36 The provincial high court has criticized courts that have lagged in
compliance. 37 High court officials report that in general most courts have
complied with the policy. 38
BEYOND THE HEADLINES 214, 215 (Timothy B. Weston & Lionel M. Jensen eds., 2012).
33. Interview 2012-13; Interview 2012-24.
34.

Interview 2012-13; see also Caipan Wenshu Shangwang "Yangguang Sifa" De Zhutuiqi
#iJt ) [Online Publication of Opinions Promotes "Sunny Judicial
#JIFY]"
Administration"], ZHONGGUO PUFA WANG ( P 1'`VM) [CHINA LEGAL INFO] (Oct. 9, 2012),

(A+151414*

http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/pfkt/content/2012-10/09/content
lawyer noting the "reference value" of cases posted online).

3886221.htm?node=7908

(quoting

35.
Interview 2012-24; Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Guocheng Zhong Cunzai De Wenti He
Duice (
[Problems Facing PublishingJudgments Online and
Solutions to Such Problems], HENAN FAYUAN WANG (1 MM ) [HENAN COURT NET] (Aug. 30,

2011), http://hnfy.chinacourt.org/article/detail/20 11/08/id/777200.shtml; Ji Yangguang Fangfu Zhi
Gongneng Er Mian

Qi

Zhuoshang Zhihuan-Zenme Kan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang
& #1111tk) [Take Advantage of Online Publication's
Sunshine Power Without Getting Burnt-How to Look at Online Publication of Judgments],
ZHONGGUO MINSHANG FAL WANG (rPMtIMthI) [CHINA CIVIL AND COMMvERCIAL LAW NET]
(a

(Jun. 9, 2012), http://test.civillaw.com.cn/Article/default.asp?id=55495 (stating that nonfinal
decisions shall not be posted online because they could "confuse the masses" if such decisions were
subsequently changed).
36.

Interview 2012-13; Luoshan Xian Fayuan Caipan Wenshu Shangwang Lu Da 100%
4St1 100%) [Luoshan Municipality's Court Judgments are 100%
Published Online], HENAN SHENG LUOSHAN XIAN FAYUAN WANG
(

( LL j5 #[tfLJ

[LUOSHAN COURT NET] (Oct. 16, 2012), http://xylsfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=1256;
Nanyang Shi Wolong

Qu

(Mii'ith t' 1

I 1Jt @M
) [Nanyang Municipal Wolong District Court

1i

Fayuan

Qianghua Caipan

Wenshu Shangwang Gongzuo Xiaoguo Hao

Reinforced the Online Publication of Judgments and the Effect Is Positive], ZHONGXIN WANG
(r1#FM) [CHINA NEWS NET] (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.ha.chinanews.com/lanmu/news/159/2011-

07-01/news-159-127846.shtml (claiming one hundred percent compliance in one court).
37. Interview 2012-24; see also Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court
Judgments on the Internet, supra note 13. In 2009, fifteen basic-level courts that "lagged behind" in
implementing the policy were exposed and the presidents of such courts were required to come to
the provincial high court to explain why they had not complied. The high court stated that such
actions were highly effective in promoting compliance. The Implementing Rules call for the
Provincial High Court to engage in regular review of implementation of the policy by each division
in the high court and by all lower courts, including issuing a ranking of courts based on their level of
compliance. Courts that lag in implementing the policy "are to have points deducted" when they are
evaluated. Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 36.
38. Interview 2012-24.
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The policy of putting cases online initially encountered resistance from
judges who feared increased workloads and scrutiny. 39 Judges and courts are
now evaluated based on the percentage of cases they put online. 40 Judges
describe such efforts as resulting in "tremendous pressure" on them as they
handle cases. 41 Lawyers concur, noting that judges are under pressure to avoid
mistakes and as a result are now far more careful than in the past. 42
The policy of making cases public has generally been praised by officials,
lawyers, and academics. 4 3 For example, lawyers who handle criminal cases
praised the policy, arguing that judges need to be controlled-and that greater
oversight and transparency are effective routes for doing so. 44 Yet the policy has
also received criticism. A number of lawyers and academics in Henan expressed
concern in discussions that the push to place all decisions online is resulting in

39. Interview 2012-24; see also Notice on the Situation Concerning Placing Henan Court
Judgments on the Internet, supra note 13 (acknowledging and critiquing resistance to the policy
among some judges who were concerned either at the workload or the effect of publishing cases
online).
40. Interview 2012-3; Interview 2012-13; Implementing Rules, supra note 13, art. 18. The
implementing rules state that judges who fail to comply with the policy, or who delay in making
cases public, shall be subject to administrative sanctions. Implementing Rules, art. 18.
41.
Interview 2012-11; Interview 2012-19; Henan Gaoyuan Jiang Panjueshu Shangwang
Gong Shimin Chaxun (f)
1t $IhI4I$ t) [Henan Provincial High Court Uploaded
Court Opinions Online for Citizens to Examine], DAHE WANG (Xtffl]) [DAHE NET] (Dec. 31,

2008), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-31/072216954042.shtml (quoting judge stating that even a
small error may be reported by parties); Zhang Liyong Daibiao Yu Wangyou Zaixian Jiaoliu:
Zhengyi
Buneng
Guanzai
Wuzi
Li
(
: E
9
f)
[RepresentativeZhang Liyong Communicates with Netizens Online: JusticeShould Not Be Locked in
a Room], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG ( rPRMVA) [CHINA LEGAL INFO NET] (Mar. 5, 2009),

http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=347301 (stating that judges know that their decisions
will be posted online and examined by ordinary people, and thus will be careful to follow the law
from the beginning).
42.

Interview 2012-7.

43.

Zhang Liyong, Shehui Fating: Tiaochu Fayuan Zhiwai de Shiian Yu Sikao
(- :t) [Society Courts: Practice and Thoughts Outside the
Courtroom], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (AME
[PEOPLE'S COURT NEWS] (Mar 17, 2010),

http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=399684
reforms);

Henan

Shengwei

FAZHI

RIBAO

M

(I

Judges],

(reporting official praise for Henan's Court

Shuji
Lu
Zhangong Yu
Faguan Daibiao Zuotan
[Party Secretary ofHenan Province Meets Representatives of
(
E1 K) [LEGAL DAILY] (Apr. 19, 2011),

http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2011-04/19/content 2603116.htm?node=20729 (reporting
praise of Henan courts by Lu Zhangong, Party Secretary of Henan); Fayuan Gongzuo Liangdian
Duo QunzhongManyidu Gao (t
fAt:Wil
[There Are Many Highlights in Courts'
Work and Approval Rate Is High], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (AtAtD
[PEOPLE'S COURT NEWS]

(Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/fayuanpingtai/xinwenzhongxin/fayuanxinwen/html/107
1/2012-01-17/content-272259.html (reporting praise of courts by Henan party officials).
44.
Interview 2012-6; Interview 2012-28; see also Zhang Liyong, Yi Caipan Wenshu
Shangwang Tuidong Sifa Gongkai (L
Iik
l)C I4tJ'E z#Fi ) [Promote Judicial Openness
through Online Publication ofDecisions], FAZHI RIBAO (
H 'ifJK [LEGAL DAILY] (Jul. 31, 2012),

http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zt/content/2012-07/31/content_3741689.htm
(stating that court
decisions are "a product" and that whether decisions are satisfactory is decided by litigants and the
masses, not the courts themselves, and that placing decisions online will force courts to improve).
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court judgments that are increasingly simple in their reasoning; these lawyers
suggest that this simplicity is the result of judges trying to avoid any possible
errors. 45 As one lawyer noted, in Henan any error becomes a "big error" when it
is posted online. 46 This alleged trend toward simplified reasoning is in tension
with the SPC's efforts to encourage courts to provide more detailed explanations
of their reasoning in opinions.47 High court officials, in contrast, argue that the
policy has forced judges to pay more attention to legal analysis and thus has
48
improved the overall quality of court opinions.
I selected for study one rural county court in Henan that appeared to be
putting the large majority of cases of all types online in 2010.49 The court is
situated in the county seat, an average-sized county town in China. I do not
claim that this county is representative either of basic courts in Henan or of
courts across China more generally. It is one of thousands of such courts in
China. 50 I also do not claim that my study is comprehensive: in 2010, the court
placed 171 cases online. I supplemented the cases found online with an
additional 6 cases from the county court that were located on commercial
websites,51 making a total of 177 cases. The highest reported case number was
45.
Interview 2012-2; Interview 2012-3; see also Liu Yuewu, Xingshi PanjueshuNi Qineng
Bu Jiangli? (JfiMAOISf
YifA!?) [How Can You Not Give Reasons in Criminal
Adjudication], FENGHUANG BOKE (iNQft) [FENGHUANG BLOG]
(May 17,
2012),

http://blog.ifeng.com/article/17858797.html (reporting that decisions in criminal cases have become
increasingly simple and lack reasoning); Hu Yuansheng, Minshi Panjueshu Yue Xie Yue Jiandan
l

[Civil Opinions Are Becoming Increasingly Simple], TIANYA

(X{))

[TIANYA BLOG] (Dec. 10, 2008), http://blog.tianya.cn/blogger/post read.asp?BlogID=1879622&Pos
tlD=15981099 (arguing that opinions in civil cases have become increasingly simple and thus
increasingly resemble criminal cases).
46. Interview 2012-3.
47.

See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Sifabianmin de Ruogan Yijian
[Some Opinions of the Sup. People's Ct. on
7fTRI)
FurtherStrengthening People's Access to Judicial Services] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct.,
(KAAtft±ttI_5&#[M

Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-03/10/content_10981330.htm
(stating that court opinions should be clear, concise, and should provide sufficient reasoning to
convince the parties); see also Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Sifa Gongkai de Liuxiang Guiding
Mfhi)/GJ4J) [Notice ofthe Supreme People's Court on Issuing the Six
tfh ((RTE tA
(KAA
Provisions on Judicial Openness], ZHONGGUO XINGWENG WANG (#rIjTRI)
[CHINA NEWS]

(Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2009/12-23/2034717.shtml (requiring courts to
provide reasons to support their decisions).
48. Interview 2012-25.
49. This was done after surveying a range of Henan courts in 2010 to ascertain the volume of
cases being put online. Judges and lawyers in the jurisdiction agreed to speak with me on the
understanding that their names and the name of their courts would not be identified. I identify court
decisions with a letter, indicating whether the decision came from the intermediate court (I) or basiclevel court (B), followed by a reference number. I cite interviews based on the year in which the
interview occurred.
50. The county court has forty-five persons classified as judges, thirty of whom hear cases.
Interview 2013-9.
51. It is unclear why those six cases were not posted to the court website. They do not appear
particularly sensitive or noteworthy. The cases may have been cases originally posted online and
then removed, as they are also available on the provincial high court website, which collects cases
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number 221, suggesting that the court placed roughly eighty percent of cases on
its website. 52 Most omitted cases involve juveniles charged with crimes or
rape. 53 Judges state that it is rare for a party to a criminal case to object to the
decision being placed online. 5 4
I also examined the publicly available annual criminal docket for 2010 of
the intermediate court in the same jurisdiction (the court directly above the
county court). The intermediate court is located in a third-tier Chinese city, with
a combined rural and urban population of approximately six million. The county
is home to roughly five hundred thousand people. 5 5 The intermediate court has
jurisdiction over a total of twelve county or district courts. 56 The cases on
review in the intermediate court thus came from a broader geographic area than
those in the county court. The intermediate court posted 276 opinions in
criminal cases from 2010 on its website. I located an additional 16 on
commercial websites, making a total of 292 judgments.57 Of these, 37 were
first-instance trials, 239 were decisions in appeals, and 16 were decisions in
rehearing procedures. Intermediate court decisions were divided across three
court divisions. Calculating the percentage of cases posted from the intermediate
court is thus more difficult than for the county court. Nevertheless, using the
highest case number as a guide and excluding decisions from the court's third
criminal division, which handles cases involving crimes committed by juveniles,
it appears that the court posted just under half of its first-instance decisions not
involving juvenile crimes, just over three-quarters of its appellate decisions, and
just over two-thirds of its rehearing cases.5 8 According to intermediate court
officials, as of early 2012 the court had placed nearly seven thousand decisions
on its website since the online policy began in the second half of 2009.59 This
was roughly half of the total number of decisional documents issued by the
intermediate court during the same period. The vast majority of excluded
documents were mediation agreements or decisional documents that do not
discuss the merits of a case. 60 The court reported just 37 instances during the

posted to lower-court websites.
52.
Court officials confirmed this rough calculation and stated that in 2012 the figure was
closer to ninety percent. Interview 2013-8.
53. Interview 2013-8; 2013-9.
54. Interview 2013-8.
(

55.
Zhongguo Yixian Erxian Sanxian Chengshi Mingdan
[China's First Tier, Second Tier, Third Their Cities List], 360DOC

(Aug.

28,

2011),

http://www.360doc.com/content/11/0828/08/0_143824472.shtml.
56. Eight lower courts were county courts and thus primarily rural. Four were district courts,
meaning they were in towns or urban areas.
57. As with the county cases, the additional cases do not appear to be particularly sensitive or
noteworthy, and it is unclear why they were not available on the intermediate-court website.
58. I calculated this approximate figure by dividing the total number of cases available by the
combination of the highest case numbers for each criminal division.
59. Interview 2012-13.
60.

Id.
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same period when a case of any type was not posted online at the request of one
of the parties. 6 1 In addition to reviewing the cases, I conducted interviews with
approximately forty judges and lawyers in three cities in Henan.
The push to place court decisions online is one of a number of innovations
adopted under the leadership of Henan High People's Court President Zhang
Liyong. Zhang, who came to the court with no legal background, has promoted
new policies he said are designed to increase the quality of, and public
confidence in, Henan's courts. 62 These have included: live broadcasts of court
cases; 6 3 requiring court leaders to meet directly with aggrieved litigants;
experimentation with a form of jury system; 6 4 requiring courts to hold hearings
in villages; 65 the creation of "society courts" (shehuifating) staffed by laypeople
to mediate cases; 66 the establishment of an annual "wrongful conviction day" on
which courts examine their files for any incorrectly decided cases; and the
creation of a "life responsibility system" for judges, under which judges are
responsible "until the end of their lives" for any errors made in handling cases. 67

61.

Id.

62.
Da Faguan Zhang Liyong Wunian Kao (
1tC
Et#) [Grand Judge Zhang
Liyong 's Exam in the Fifth Year], MINZHU YU FAZHI WANG (RTh4gJb [DEMOCRACY AND
LEGAL SYsTEM NET] (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/minzhuyufazhishibao/fanfu/html

/1248/2012-11-12/content-568478.html (discussing Henan efforts to make courts more welcoming to
ordinary people and requiring judges to be more like ordinary people, strengthening courts'
obedience to Party leadership and their rejection of concepts of separation of powers, and making
courts more open to comments from ordinary people). The moves were controversial, with some
complaining that judges were being forced to take on inappropriate roles and would be overwhelmed
by their new workload.
63. For a live broadcast of court cases of Henan Courts, see http://ts.hncourt.org/. As of early
2012, the High Court reported that more than 1500 cases had been broadcast online.
64.
Henan Gaoyuan Yuanzhang Jianyi Pizhun Jinxing Renmin Peishentuan Shidian
(f@Af
T
[ChiefJudge ofHenan Provincial High Ct. Proposes
Approving Jury Trial Experiment], DAHE BAO (Xltiffl) [DAHE NEWS], (Mar. 13, 2012),
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-03-13/031424103258.shtml.
65.
Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Dali Hongyang Ma Xiwu Shenpan Fangshi
Qieshi Wei Renmin Sifa De Yian (i
}SA
Oitfji) [Henan High People's Court'sNotice on Energetically CarryingForwardMa Xiwu-Style
Adjudication in Order to Implement Justice for the People] (promulgated by the Henan High

People's Ct., Jul. 15, 2009), available at http://zzfy.hncourt.org/public/detail.php?id=1 1729.
66.
/
HENAN

KL5

%":

"Shehui Fating": Huajie Maodun De Henan Chuangzao ("Th
["Society Courts": A Henan Innovation That Resolves Contradictions],
PINGAN
WANG
(M1Pf)
[HENAN
PINGAN
NET]
(Jun.
3,
2011),

See

If@

MiJ)

http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/jujiaosanxiangzhongdiangongcheng/shehuiguanlichuangxin/shehuibaoz
hang/html/1037/2011-06-03/content-76470.html; see also Zhao Gang et al.,Xuchang Fayuan: Dakai
I@[] ) [Xuchang Court:
:fl@
:IJff±i
±@6
Shehui Fating Shenshang De Wenhao (
Unfold the Question Mark on Society Courts], LUOYANG SHI XIGONG Qu RENMIN FAYUAN WANG
E
tAP
M) [LUOYANG PEOPLE'S COURT] (May 17, 2011), http://xgqfy.chinacourt.or

($4FH0I%

g/public/detail.php?id=78. Society courts, made up of ordinary people selected from the local
community, are designed to further mediation in routine cases. They appear largely to be the
repackaging of traditional mediation authorities under the direct supervision of the courts.
67.
(

See Ji Tianfu, Henan Fayuan Yanjiu Jianli Cuoan Zeren Zhongshen Zhujiu Zhidu
[Henan Courts Will Research and Establish Lfelong
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Zhang has also welcomed increased supervision of the courts from the People's
Congress representatives. 68 Some of these policies have drawn extensive
criticism from legal academics, who warn of a return to populist justice and who
argue that many of these reforms lack a legal basis. 69 In one prominent early
account of Zhang's reforms, Southern Weekend described him as a "judge who
does not play according to legal principles." 70 Yet others in the legal community
have come to his defense, noting that he has significantly increased judicial
transparency.71
Responsibility System for Wrongly Decided Cases], RENMIN FAYUAN

WANG (kR

M)

[PEOPLE'S COURT NET] (Jan. 11, 2012), http://court.gmw.cn/html/article/201201/11/83609.shtml. It
appears that the lifetime responsibility system is targeted at the most egregious forms of judicial
misconduct, primarily corruption.
Zhudong Jieshou Renda Daibiao Jiandu (Mif :
Courts Should Take Initiative To Accept People's
Congress's Supervision over their Handling of Cases], FAZHI WANG (tA[W) [LEGAL DAILY] (Sep.
68.

Henan: Fayuan Ban'an Yao
J

)[Henan:

15, 2011), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/201109/15/content 2956921.htm?node=209
08 (detailing requirements that each court report on its work to every local people's congresses
delegate regularly, including on its handling of major cases; that courts invite delegates to attend
cases and participate in enforcement activities; and that each court establish a text-messaging system
(

to report to People's Congress members on their work); see also Henan Sanji Fayuan Quanbu
KaitongRenda Daibiao Zhengxie Weiyuan Zhuanxian Dianhua
ttf)#A tt) [Three Levels of Courts in Henan All Opened Hotlines for People's Congress
Representatives and People 's Consultative Committee Members], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG
T
) [CHINA COURT] (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.chinacourt.org
HENAN PINGDAO (A1'$J

#

/article/detail/2012/04/id/479195.shtml (discussing the creation of hotlines to be used by people's
congress delegates to contact the courts twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and requiring
courts to respond to any enquiries within one working day).
69.
See He Weifang, Sifa Gaige Bixu An Fali Chupai (
B
'
3
[Legal
Reform Must Follow Legal Principles], 360DOC (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.360doc.com/content/09

/0227/16/142_2660965.shtml (arguing that populist justice is sometimes bad law and that some of
Zhang Liyong's reform measures may set a bad example for judicial reform); Guo Guangdong,
Yuanzhang, Qing An Fali Chupai (K,
Principles], NANFANG
ZHOUMO
( 1it12)

[Court President, Please Play by Legal
[SOUTHERN
WEEKEND]
(Feb.
2,
2011),

http://www.gongxue.cn/landunfalv/ShowArticle.asp?ArticlelD=97378;

Buan Fali Chupai Zhi

Yuanzhang Yulu de Shixiang Zai Zhiyi (?T1ft tft#t
iA9 jN[)@ [Ten Doubts on the
Quotations of the Court President Who Does Not Follow Legal Principles],ZHENGYI WANG (I1JK

[JUSTICE NET] (Apr. 6, 2012), http://chinaszjt.fyfz.cn/art/1048006.htm (arguing that only one or two
measures Zhang adopted are reasonable but that others hurt the independence and credibility of the
judicial system); Guo Shushan, Zhang Yuanzhang Chuli Pingdingshan Fayuan De Zuofa Fansi
(
d0
[Reflection on Chief Judge Zhang 's Measures for Handling
Pingdingshang Court],
FALD
WANG
(tSM) [LEGAL NET]
(Jan.
20,
2011),

http://www.66law.cn/domainblog/24124.aspx (criticizing reforms under Zhang Liyong for confusing
the role of courts and "ordinary Party-state entities" and for undermining judicial independence).
70.
See Su Yongtong, Buan "Fali" Chupai De Gaoyuan Yuanzhang (Tf
"$fl! " it W 0
At[ -K) [High Court President Does Not Play According to Legal Principles], NANFANG
ZHUOMO (-A Th
M.) [SOUTHERN WEEKEND] (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.infzm.com/content/24067
(describing promotion of informal trials and mediation, increasing role of popular input, deemphasis

on judicial professionalism, and increasing administrative oversight over lower courts).
71.

See Zhang Yifei, Bubi Keze Henan Fayuan De "Zhang Yuanzhang Xinzheng"
TK
'AH" Ki#f ) [It Is Not Necessary To Criticize Court President Zhang 's New
Measures], HONG WANG ( II)
[RED NET] (Mar. 6, 2009), http://hlj.rednet.cn/c/2009/03/06/172020
8.htm (praising Zhang Liyong's reforms as compatible with the reality of China); Sifa Shjjian

(--Ez
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II.
FINDINGS

A. Overview
1. County Court
The 177 county court cases included criminal charges against 273
defendants. In the county court, the types of cases were largely what would be
expected: the largest categories of crimes were theft, willful injury (generally
relating to fights), traffic accident crimes, concealment of criminal proceeds
(largely reselling stolen goods), and fraud. But the cases also included a range of
crimes that provide a sense of the types of issues local police, procuratorates,
and courts process-everything from dissemination of porn online, 72 to illegal
logging or cutting of trees, 7 3 to abduction and sale of children or women, 74
rape, 75 bigamy, 76 corruption,] 7 and gambling.7 8 A large number of cases
involve fellow villagers. Table 1 sets forth the range of crimes and number of
defendants prosecuted for each category of crime in the county court in 2010. In
the county court, 133 cases were handled in summary procedures or simplified
79
normal procedures; often these were tried without procurators attending.
Although most were minor cases where defendants did not contest the charges
against them, others involved more serious charges, including one case in which
a defendant was convicted of rape. 80

f

Weishenme Mei An Fali Chupai (% ttJ#tft&S
"tt"
Follow 'legal Principles"], FAL
BOKE ($t1tW)

t}t)
[LAW

[Why Doesn't JudicialPractice
BLOG]

(Nov.

13,

2009),

http://liumushuofa.fyfz.cn/art/544585.htm (arguing that courts are not trusted in Chinese society and
that courts should do more to emulate administrative agencies); Wang Liping, Sifa Gaige De
Kunjing Yu Lujing (EMBAtE4i$TF) [The Predicament of and Path for Judicial Reform],
ZHONGGUO RENMIN DAXUE LOSHI XUEYUAN (
tALt iff~) [LAWYER COLLEGE RENMIN
UNIVERSITY OF CHINA] (Apr. 21, 2011), http://lawyer.ruc.edu.cn/html/lswy/3870.html (arguing that

under the reforms in Henan judges are shifting from more elite status to "legal service providers,"
and are "entering into society" with their primary focus being on social stability, and noting that the
reforms are consistent with the general political framework in China).
72.
Cases B66, B99, and B200.
73.
Cases B45, B51, B80, and B92. Although classified as environmental crimes, these cases
largely appear to be handled as theft cases.
74. Cases B32 and B94.
75.
Case B166.
76.
Case B2.
77.
Cases B104, B169, B203, and B213.
78.
Cases B90 (gambling) and B97 (operation of a gambling facility).
79. Procurators attended 77 of the 133 trials involving defendants tried through simplified or
simplified normal procedures. The 1996 Criminal Procedure Law did not require procurator
attendance in cases tried through simplified procedures. 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6,
art 153. The 2012 Criminal Procedure Law makes procurator attendance mandatory at all trials. 2012
Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, art. 210.
80.
Case B3166. Although the opinion stated that the court used simplified procedures, three
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TABLE 1: CASES PROSECUTED IN THE COUNTY COURT BY CRIME SENTENCED

Case Type

~) 3

1

Defendants

Cases

2

1

1

1

49

22

3

3

2

1

14

4

1
2

1
2

Falsely issuing exclusive value-added tax invoices

6

2

Forecri and/or salc of state authoritics' certificites

5

1

Abducetioln ande trmflickinge of children (t

)

Abduction and tmfficking of women (t)

Arsoni (Ik

)1

Bigamy (I)

Pf

Concealment of illegal gains (

ContIIract frauid (f1
CorrIption (I 1

ijg)
Y j)

Destruction of electrical equpimnt (
Dissemination of obscene materials (fi

Distuirbanice of the ce
Embezzlement (R%{di
Extort ion anid blackmil

)
Frauid (j5[:1

a

WC$.I5
)

(I W '1i

188

Gamiiblig (1 t1 fl

5

Illegal business act (

1

Illga lggng(4h4tt~)11
Illegal occupation of farmland (J$

Illegall possssionlologuns (J-_
Illegal sale of invoices (J$1±J)

fi5

V--f

it)

3J3

i~

',W)

Intentioalll diestructioll of property
Intentional injury (tI1'

1

4

)

Interference with public administration (

I

1

1

1

1

37

35

4

4

judges heard the case (as opposed to most simplified cases, where generally only a single judge
hears the case). The defendant contested guilt, arguing that sex had been consensual. Nevertheless,
the court deemed defendant to have confessed because he admitted having sex with the mentally
disabled victim.
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Involuntary manslaughter (ifKf
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of pub~l~l[-itc fnd
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1
1

1

1

1

Production and/or sale of fake and substandard
products (iF
PA

5

2

Raipc (,FJ1

1I
1

1

Robbery (firf-J,)

2

1

Seizure by force (r

1

1

Traffic accident (

28

28

Toall

27-

187

(

Operation of gambling facility (f)

)

Organized robbery\~/

Refusal to execute court decision (4

Theflt

(

g

gyJ

~843

Note: "Cases" refers to the nunber of cases in which a particular crime was
charged. Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times. The total
number of unique cases is 177.
"Defendants" refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular crime.
Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted multiple
times.
2. Intermediate Court
Tables 2-4 provide an overview of cases in the intermediate court in firstinstance cases, on appeal, and in rehearing cases. The intermediate court tried 37
first-instance cases involving 67 defendants. The court decided 239 cases on
appeal, involving 442 defendants. The intermediate court also decided 16
criminal cases through rehearing procedures, including 21 defendants.
The intermediate court's first-instance cases were, not surprisingly, more
serious: murder and negligent homicide, illegal manufacture of explosives, 81
drug trafficking, 82 illegal detention of others, and robbery while impersonating a
police officer. 83 A number of commercial and financial crimes were also tried in
the intermediate court, including defendants convicted of illegally soliciting
deposits (presumably running an illegal bank), selling fake medicine, and the
sale of counterfeit goods. A few of the financial fraud cases resulted in
suspended death sentences (for example, for the sale of counterfeit money) or

81.
Case 15b (life sentence).
82.
Case 144b (life sentence for trafficking one thousand grams of opium, where one thousand
grams is the threshold for a sentence of ten years to death).
83.
Case 151b.
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life imprisomnent (for a first time offender convicted of selling counterfeit
money). 84
TABLE 2: FIRST-INSTANCE INTERMEDIATE COURT CASES BY CRIMES
CHARGED

Crime

Defendants

Credit card

fraud (I

Selling counterfeit monIe (UPId

Bribery%

)~t<~
t1I )

Cases

1

1

(j)

Contract fralud ()
Robbery (t

2)

Misa1ppropriation of public ftnds (tff&>A)
Concealment of stolen goods OIL,

ii

1

E

2

fll)

Willful injuyt

1

2

1

intentional homicide (,I)
Receipt fraud (

i

Harboring criminals (

Kidnappingo1
)f
Fraud (
Drugo traffickingo (I)IU7,
Corruption (A
)

)

~ )53
)

Theft (i

11

Fraudulent raising of capital (
Illegal manufalicturing of
Loan swindle

(

Toail

1j'

1)
42

)

51
f_

explosives (t

?

3
3)1

7840

Note: "Defendants" refers to the nunmber of defendants charged with a particular
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted
multiple times.
"Cases" refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged.
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.

84.

Case 143a.
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TABLE

3: APPEALS

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT BY CRIME CHARGED

Crime
Triffic ccidlent (

Pejury (f

Defendants
-A)

iEJ@

Cases
16

1)

)3

Instirince fraid (N

)

Torture (fji

[Vol. 33:1

1

Participation in the mafia

[j

)

1

16

Bribery (2 H~)33
)

Contract fraud (1`1
Obstructing public

f"i)

)

Obstructing testimony (

hl enforeient (

)

Misapproriationefefundsts
Provocation (
Aid inl destr-oying( ceidce (iE

1

Case2s

26

1

Aid criminals to escape punishment (

1

1

WeaC'pon the~ft (I,
Robbery (JR)

1

1J

)

4

(

)

Abductioniand sale of children

1I1

Abduction and sale of women
Misaippropriation of public funds (J

)

1

Conicalmenlt of stolen goods (HL ii'

' L"Jj

15

In1tentionll1 inljury- (f11'
In1tentional homlicide
In1tentionll1 properclty damageo

H~~

1

Extottio

96
0ii~
12I

Ille

68

~

17

oggn1

4
5

27

Crimes related to criminal syndicate (,'

Abutisec o f p)owe N
l
Neglect ofdty (J
Producing and selling fake and inferior goods (1P

9

3
1

2

2

1

1

2

2

Excavating aniiicnt tms('t~
27

Theft6

Saibotagig pr-odution anid buisiess operationi (ii
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3

Embezzlement (

1

8ll)

Assembling crowd to disturb social order

14

3

aiid branling, ()1

Mob gitlieril

False reporting of company registration capital ()I1
Friud ([

11)

1

False accusation (iji "-)

6

2
4

Drug trafficking (d)7
Corruption (

(If

)

)1
Buy ing counterfeit monc

Gambling (Mt$~

1)

Negligent inflictionl of injurl

.

2)2
fake

1

)

Tax evasion (R
)2
Knolingll
sellin
merchandcise under a
trademark
I
Selling fake medicine (
)

)

Producing fake medicine (T

1'1

Illegal trading of explosives
)
Illegal production of and salc of falsificd receipt

10
1

Ilea ratc
1
J f eiie ~~~1
IlealMnig( ~ of )1
explosives (12
Illegal manufacturing

51

111co~11

Illegal occupatlionl of, frm-1ingo

1

2liii

ld(

r

52
(

Illegally accepting deposits from the public

10

Illegal possession of guns

)

Illegal de~tention (4j -)

2

21

Unlawfu l business operatio11

Withdrawing public funds for investment

(1

Falsified tax rcei pts
Crime of having a large amount of undisclosed
propertyu
Vuies prTon (0
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Crimei of, conlingll
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1

Total

550

277

Note: "Defendants" refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted
multiple times.
"Cases" refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged.
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.
TABLE

4: REHEARING

(ZAISHEN) CASES IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT

Crime

Defendants

Cases

Traiffic accidenti crim (tnc W~
M\Iisappropriat ion of public ttnids (tfI&

2

2?

11
2-,

2

t)

'

Corruption (~?~
5
,L)J-8
Willful injury\ (t1f
$~
Provocaitioni Ill
llegalldetention (J 4t,_ )
Abuise of p~oweri (,111', C~
Thieft(l~
Frauid (it1~

1
1
1
4

4

4
1
4
42

Total

30

19

Note: "Defendants" refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted
multiple times.
"Cases" refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged.
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.
B. Leniency and Settlement
Scholars in China and the West have noted the national adoption of the
policy of "balancing leniency and severity." 85 The policy, adopted in 2005 and

85.

See Trevaskes, supra ; Margaret K. Lewis, Leniency and Severity in China's Death

Penalty Debate, 24 CoLu1vI. J. ASIAN L. 303, 317 (2011) (discussing debate over leniency and
severity in capital cases); Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Guanche Kuanyanxiangji Xingshi
Zhengce De Ruogan Yijian De Tongzhi

(&iiA

l ARBU& (

Wfffffg

-fgg

)ii Ab) [Supreme People's Court's Notice on Printing and Distributing Some Views on
Implementation of the Criminal Policy of Balancing Leniency with Severity] (promulgated by Sup.
People's Ct., Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law view.asp?id-310425
(stating that the policy of balancing leniency with severity is "the basic criminal policy of the nation"
and that it should be implemented at all stages of the criminal process). The policy calls for strict
sentences and the death penalty for serious crimes, including those that involve violence or threats to
society, and leniency for less serious crimes, including nonviolent offenses or those lacking malice.
The policy was first announced in a 2005 document from the Communist Party's Central Political
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implemented beginning in 2007,86 is generally understood as a reaction to the
perception that prior reliance on "strike hard" campaigns had been ineffective
and generated a strong backlash.87 The "balancing leniency and strictness"
policy encourages procurators and courts to treat serious crimes harshly but also
encourages them to be lenient toward minor crimes, especially those not
reflecting malice or posing significant risk of harm to society. In the courts, the
emphasis on leniency is primarily manifest in reduced sentences for those who
confess, as well as on the use of suspended sentences in minor criminal cases for
those who agree to pay restitution or compensation to their victims. 88
The Chinese Criminal Law 89 provides multiple mechanisms for a court to
be lenient (or not) in its disposition of a case. The law generally stipulates a
range of punishments for each crime based on whether the offending conduct
was minor, serious, or extremely serious, or, for monetary crimes, whether the
amount involved was small, large, or extremely large. 90 A court must first
determine the severity of the crime, placing it within a codified sentencing band
for a specific crime, after which it selects a sentence within that band. A court

and Legal Committee. See also Zuigao Renmin Jianchayuan Guanyu Zai Jiancha Gongzuo Zhong
Guanche Kuanyanxiangji Xingshi Sifa Zhengce De Ruogan Yijian (&i±AAtR
I
j
[Several Opinions on Implementing the Policy of
Balancing Severity with Leniency in Criminal Adjudication] (promulgated by the Sup. People's
Procuratorate, Jan 15, 2007), available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law view.asp?id=188373
(stating that procuratorates are to follow the policy of balancing severity and leniency in order to
reduce conflict and assist in the creation of a "socialist harmonious society"); Li Yunhui,
Kuanyanxiangfi

Xingshi

Zhengce

Ji
Shixian
De
Lujing
Xuanze
Orientation and Route Selection for the
Criminal Policy ofBalancingSeverity with Leniency], FAXUE LUNTAN ( t t [CHINA LAW INFO],
(

Dingwei

)[Policy

http://www.chinalawinfo.org/fulltext form.aspx?Db=qikan&Gid=1510092872&EncodingName=
(last visited April 17, 2015) (describing creation of the policy).
86.
Susan Trevaskes, The Shifting Sands of Punishment in China in the Era of "Harmonious
Society, " 32 LAW & POLICY 332, 346 (2010).
87.
See, e.g., Liu RENWEN, XINGFA DE JIEGOU YU SHIYE ( Kt
) [THE STRUCTURE
AND SCOPE OF CRIMINAL LAW] 274-291 (2010) (arguing that the policy is primarily aimed at

introducing leniency into the Chinese criminal justice system, as a reaction to the prior policy of
striking hard against crime).
88. In China the term "suspended sentence" generally refers to the suspension of the
defendant's prison term. Any fines imposed as part of the sentence are not suspended. In this Article,
I use the term "suspended sentence" to refer to suspension of a prison sentence, and "sentence" to
refer to a prison sentence. The use of fines as a criminal sanction in China is an important possible
future topic of research. Although some decisions do impose fines on defendants, fines appeared to
play a relatively minor role in criminal cases in the jurisdictions I studied and rarely came up in
interviews.

89. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (
[Criminal Law of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 14, 1997, President
Order No. 83, of the President of the People's Republic of China. Mar. 14, 1997, amended Feb. 25,
2011), available at http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2012-01/14/content_24405327.htm
(last
visited Apr. 11, 2015) [hereafter Criminal Law].
90. The Criminal Law provides little in the way of guidance as to what type of conduct
qualifies as serious or very serious; such specifics are generally provided in subsequent judicial
interpretations.
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that seeks to be lenient thus can assign a sentence at the bottom of the range for
the offense, referred to as congqing, or lightening the sentence. 91
In certain cases, a court may also issue a sentence below the minimum for a
specific crime set forth in the Criminal Law, referred to as jianqing, or
mitigating a sentence. 92 A court may decide to convict a defendant but exempt
the defendant from punishment, referred to as mianchuchufa.9 3 In cases of
minor crimes, courts may also determine that the conduct in question did not
constitute a crime. 94 In addition, the Criminal Law states that defendants who
are sentenced to terms of three years or less may be granted suspended sentences
if they do not pose a threat to society. 9 5 Taken together, these provisions mean
that Chinese courts have a very high level of discretion in sentencing. 96
In addition to the Criminal Law, the SPC has provided guidance to lower
courts regarding leniency and the use of suspended sentences, stipulating that
defendants sentenced to three years in prison or less may receive suspended
sentences or be exempt from punishment. 97 In practice this means that
defendants convicted of a crime for which the maximum sentence is three years
or less are eligible for suspended sentences, as are those convicted of a more
serious offense who are given only a three-year sentence. The Henan High
People's Court has issued its own sentencing guidelines, which add detail to
those issued by the SPC. 9 8 Generally speaking, in Henan defendants sentenced
to three years or less are divided into two categories. Court rules state that
suspended sentences should be given to minors, pregnant women, or persons

)

91. For examples of provisions discussing situations giving rise to lighter sentences or
exemption from punishment, see Criminal Law, supra note 89, arts. 7, 10, 17, 18, 19, 22, 29, 65. For
a more detailed discussion of how sentencing works in practice, see Li Li, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in
China: Rigidity or Flexibility?, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 655, 658 (2010).
92. For example, see 2012 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, arts. 20, 21, 24, 28, 68. A
number of provisions in the Criminal Law give courts the discretion to lighten or to mitigate a
sentence.
93. See, e.g., id. arts. 24, 67, 351.
94. 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, arts. 13, 15.
95. Id. art. 72. Revisions to the law in 201 1-after the cases examined in this article were
decided-added greater specificity to article 72. Such changes were largely consistent with the
judicial interpretations discussed below, see infra note 98, that were applicable in 2010.
96. The limited scholarship on sentencing in English has generally emphasized this discretion
See, e.g., Li Li, supra 91, at 658-63.
97.
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Liangxing Zhidao Yijian (i
( 7
[Supreme People's Court Opinion on Criminal Sentencing Guidelines (Provisional)] (promulgated
by the Sup. People's Ct., Sep. 13, 2010), available at http://www.xingshill0.com/xingfafagui/17082
.html.

98. Henan Sheng Gaoji Renmin Fayun Renmin Fayuan Liangxing Zhidao Yijian (Shixing)
) 9O)EBhJ) [Implementation
Shishi Xize (RP~ikk&}}Aggy (KgggiXtflgg7RL (jf)
Provisions of the Henan High People's Court's Criminal Sentencing Guidelines (Provisional)]
(promulgated by the Henan High People's Ct., effective Oct. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.lawtime.cn/article/lll38346403839734oo28122
[hereinafter Supreme People's Ct.
Guideline on Sentencing (Provisional)] (stating that defendants qualify for a suspended sentence
when they are given a sentence of three years or less and meet other specified provisions).
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over seventy-five. 99 For all others, the imposition of a suspended sentence is
discretionary and is determined by a range of factors relating to the defendant's
conduct. Judges say it is official policy in Henan for courts to try suspending
sentences in cases where the statutory sentence is three years or less. 100 Yet the
policy grants significant discretion to local courts; as a result, actual practice at
the local level varies. 10 1
Until recently formal law did not authorize courts to base sentencing
determinations on whether a defendant had paid compensation to her or his
victim. Nevertheless, the practice emerged and spread throughout the 2000s, in
particular following a 2010 notice from the SPC concerning implementation of
the Combining Severity with Leniency policy. The notice stated that
reconciliation in criminal cases helped to resolve future cases and prevent
petitioning. 102 In the SPC's 2010 annual work report to the National People's
Congress, the SPC noted the value of mediating compensation agreements in
cases where defendants received suspended death sentences. 103 China's revised
Criminal Procedure Law, which became effective on January 1, 2013, explicitly
authorizes the use of criminal settlement procedures in specific circumstances.
These include crimes arising out of private disputes punishable by three years
imprisonment or less and crimes of negligence punishable by seven years
imprisonment or less. 104 At the time of the cases examined in this Article,

99. Id. ch. 2, art. 3, para. 7 (stating that defendants who are sentenced to three years or less
and who meet other specified preconditions may have their sentences suspended); Interview 201225.
100.

Interview

FffJVf

(WM [Wff
Policy],

HENAN

2012-25;

Henan

Fayuan

Ni

Tui

"Huanxing

Yugao

Shu" Zhi
Notice

t" MIJ) [Henan Courts Plan to Extend Suspended Sentence Advance
PINDAO

(Mf

7fiA)

[HENAN

CHANNEL]

(Aug.

13,

2009),

http://henan.people.com.cn/news/2009/08/13/411406.html.
101. Interview 2012-26. Supreme People's Ct. Guideline on Sentencing (Provisional), supra
note 98, ch. 2, art. 3, para. 6. The Criminal Law provides only rough guidelines regarding when a
defendant who has been sentenced to three years or less of detention may be given a suspended
sentence: when the circumstances of the crime are light, when the defendant has shown remorse,
when there is no risk of reoffending, and when there would be no negative effects on the local area
from a suspended sentence. Criminal Law, supranote 89, arts. 72-77.
102. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Guanche Kuanyan Xiangji Xingshi Zhengce de
Ruogan Yijian de Tongzhi (&AAPthM*& (iP
g
_) nitL[
[Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Issuing Some Advice on Implementing the Criminal
Policy of Combining Leniency with Strictness] (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Feb. 8, 2010),
available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law view.asp?id=3 10425. For a description of the
emergence of the practice of settlement in criminal cases in the late 2000s, see Rosenzweig et al.,
The 2012 Revision of the Criminal ProcedureLaw: (Mostly) Old Wine in New Bottles 21-32 (CRJ

Occasional Paper, 2012).
103. The SPC emphasized the importance of courts' not immediately carrying out death
sentences in order to allow for victims' families and defendants' to reach a settlement and thus
"reduce social contradictions." Zuigao fa: Yange Zhangwo He Tonyi Sixing Shiyong Biaozhun
:
Subject to
(RA

[Supreme Court: Death Penalty Strictly Controlled and
g[
Uniform Standards], XINHUA WANG (#4Ipj) [XINHUA]
(May 25, 2011),

http://www.people.com.cn/GB/220005/222646/14738739.html.
104. 2012 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, arts. 277-79. For an analysis of the new
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however, China's Criminal Procedure Law did not authorize courts to consider
compensation agreements as factors influencing sentences.
The promotion of settlement in criminal cases followed a general renewed
emphasis on mediation in China's courts in the early 2000s. Embrace of the
practice reflected the belief that mediated cases were less likely to result in
escalation, protest, and petitioning from victims or defendants (or their families).
The policy also reflected resource concerns in the criminal justice system
resulting from increased numbers of criminal cases and the belief than many
minor offenders, in particular first offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes, did
not need to be incarcerated.
In this Article I use the term "leniency" to refer to two specific phenomena
in China's courts: the widespread use of suspended sentences, in some cases
even for defendants facing a sentence in excess of three years, and the decision
to give a suspended death sentence or life imprisonment to a defendant whose
conduct made him or her eligible for the death penalty. My focus is thus on the
actual sentences courts grant, not on the legal provisions concerning leniency.
My findings provide evidence of how the policy is being implemented at
the local level and suggest that local courts' embrace of leniency and settlement
exceeds national policy. Judges in Henan stated that they try to be lenient where
they can, in particular in cases involving minor crimes, crimes committed by
youths or students, crimes committed within a family, cases involving
defendants who turn themselves in, and cases in which a family member turns in
a relative. 105 As one judge explained, if "cases come from ordinary lives" then
provisions, including controversy leading up to their adoption, see Rosenzweig et al., supra note
102, at 21-32. The revised law also explicitly states that in such cases the procuratorate may
recommend that a defendant receive a lenient sentence or be exempt from punishment. 2012
Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, art. 279. Prior to the revision, the 1996 Criminal Procedure
Law authorized settlement only in cases involving private prosecutions. 1996 Criminal Procedure
Law, supra note 6, art. 172.
105. Official reports list seven categories of cases in which courts ordinarily should issue
suspended sentences in Henan: defendants who take appropriate action to minimize harm; minors;
deaf, mute, blind or disabled defendants who lack the ability to harm society; those who terminate
their crime; those who turn themselves in or engage in meritorious service after the crime; those who
assist in cracking a case; and those who commit crimes of negligence. In an additional five
categories of cases, courts in Henan have the discretion to issue suspended sentences: those who
commit intentional crimes in which there is little negative intent; those who actively repay stolen
goods; those who actively pay compensation to victims; those who pay fines in advance; and those
who turn themselves in, confess, or otherwise engage in conduct stipulated in law as a basis for
leniency. The policy also specifically excludes certain defendants from eligibility for suspended
sentences: defendants who fail to confess, fail to show remorse, or cause serious harm; defendants
who have "despicable motivations"; defendants who use the proceeds of crimes to engage in other
illegal conduct; defendants who take part in a collective crime whose conduct is serious or who
commit multiple crimes; defendants with a prior criminal record or who have been subject to
administrative sanction two or more times in the past; defendants whose crime involves the use of
national relief funds or materials or whose crimes otherwise have serious characteristics. Similarly,
defendants whose crimes are subject to punishment of a minimum of three years or more will not be
eligible for a suspended sentence unless they have surrendered or engaged in other legally stipulated
basis for leniency. Defendants whose crimes are to be punished by a sentence of five years or more
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courts will try to be lenient, even if there is no formal legal basis for doing so. 106
Likewise, courts may seek to be lenient in cases where a victim was partially at
fault, such as in intentional injury cases arising from fights. 107
Judges acknowledged some flexible adaptation of the SPC's official policy.
Henan courts often impose suspended sentences for crimes that ordinarily would
result in a three-to-seven-year sentence, for example sentencing the defendant to
three years and then suspending the sentence. Some observers suggested that the
policy was in tension with the SPC's intent that suspended sentences be used
only for minor crimes,10 8 although technically the SPC rules do permit the use
of a suspended sentence for those sentenced to three years for a crime for which
the legally stipulated range is three to seven years.
The 177 county court decisions in my dataset resulted in criminal
convictions for 273 individual defendants, 219 of whom were given criminal
sentences. Sixty-nine percent of these sentences, 152 sentences, were suspended
sentences, meaning that defendants spent no time in prison following the
judgment. An additional 53 defendants received only fines or were sentenced to
detention or control. 109 Many others who received a sentence received a
relatively short one. The median sentence for such defendants was three years,
reflecting the fact that most county court cases concerned relatively minor
crimes. Cases that resulted in suspended sentences generally involved first-time
offenders charged with relatively minor crimes such as fights, traffic offenses
are only eligible for a suspended sentence if there is a legal basis for reducing their sentence to three

R

ft

years or below. Henan Fayuan Nitui 'Huanxing Yugao Shu" Zhi (I4 A
Wf" X fr'J ff #
$J) [Henan Courts Plan to Apply Suspension Advance Notice Policy], HENAN PINDAO (R"

It"

[HENAN CHANNEL] (Aug. 13, 2009), http://henan.people.com.cn/news/2009/08/13/411406.html. An
article by a judge in the Henan provincial capital, Zhengzhou, provided some additional details as to
how judges apply the policy. Qianxi 'Huanxing Yugaoshu" De Sifa Jiazhi (A t" X R # It"

0 JA $

WANG (#I4

1t Q) [A BriefAnalysis ofSuspension Advance Notice's Judicial Value], HENAN FAYUAN
i$ [ V) [HENAN COURT NET] (Aug. 17, 2009), http://hnfy.chinacourt.org/article/

detail/2009/08/id/746727.shtml. The judge noted seven types of cases in which suspended sentences
are used: traffic accidents and other crimes of negligence; minor crimes involving students at
universities or other schools; minor crimes by juveniles; cases of minor harm to persons, serious
harm resulting from negligence, serious harm with an "antecedent," or cases of harm to property or
other economic harm in which the defendant actively agrees to pay compensation minor crimes to
property such as theft; criminal disputes resulting from disputes among neighbors or family
members; and cases involving crimes of negligence, accomplices, those who terminate their crimes,
who turn themselves in, or in which the defendant engages in meritorious service or takes
preventative action or action to minimize the harm. Id.
106. Interview 2012-25.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Detention refers to a short sentence, not to exceed one year, administered by the police in
a police-run detention facility, not a prison. In theory those sentenced to detention have greater
liberty than those sentenced to prison. Criminal Law, supra note 89, arts. 42-44. Control, sometimes
also translated as "public surveillance," refers to defendants who are not incarcerated but have their
movements monitored by the police and who must obtain police permission for a range of activities.
Id. arts. 1, 38-41; Cases B49, B184, B187, and B189 (explaining that four defendants received
detention and a fine, all for theft).
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resulting in personal injury, and low-value thefts. Most outcomes appear
consistent with the SPC's instructions on balancing severity and leniency.
Yet the leniency apparent in cases in the dataset appears to go beyond that
announced in official policy. Numerous cases that one might expect to result in
incarceration under China's Criminal Law instead resulted in suspended
sentences. Thus, for example, the dataset includes multiple traffic crime cases in
which a drunk driver caused a fatality or fatalities but received only a suspended
sentence, despite the Criminal Law specifying a sentence range of three to seven
years. 110 Other cases involved violent conflict with local authorities that
nevertheless resulted in suspended sentences, including a defendant who drew a
knife on local officials seeking to seize counterfeit cigarettes11 1 and a case in
which a villager attacked a local birth planning official in his home with an
axe. 1 12 Likewise, the county court granted suspended sentences in a case
involving arson 113 and in four separate cases involving corruption by local
officials,1 14 the largest of which involved the theft of 70,000 yuan. 115 The
practice of granting leniency in cases involving corruption by officials appears
directly in conflict with an SPC notice on the policy of balancing leniency and
severity, which explicitly called for strict punishment for crimes involving
official malfeasance. 116 In another case, defendants convicted of manufacturing
and selling low-quality (presumably fake) fertilizer received suspended
sentences. Although the court found that their crime had yielded 120,000 yuan
in profit and caused 340,000 yuan in harm, it nevertheless gave defendants a
suspended sentence in a simplified trial. 1 17
Settlement with the victim or victim's family appeared to be the most
significant factor that led courts to impose lenient sentences. Sixty-eight of the
county court cases reported settlements with victims or their families; another
fourteen cases reported payment of restitution or compensation in cases not
involving personal injury; and thirty cases reported the return of stolen goods. 118
Fifty-eight of the cases in which defendants paid victims mentioned that

110. See, e.g., Case B193 (deciding that sentences be suspended, despite multiple fatalities).
111. Case B153.
112. Case B55 (illustrating that the defendant had argued and fought with the official earlier in
the day, apparently when the official visited defendant's home in the course of his duties as the local
birth planning official).
113. Case B91.
114. Cases B104, B169, B199, and B213.
115. Case B3199. In contrast, a defendant in a credit card fraud case who was convicted of
stealing 10,000 yuan received six years in prison and was fined 60,000 yuan. Case B 142.
116. Notice of the Supreme People's Court on Issuing Some Advice on Implementing the
Criminal Policy of Combining Leniency with Strictness, supra note 102, art. 8.
117. Case B130 (demonstrating that the defendants had surrendered and had assisted the police
in locating other criminals).
118. Cases B179 and Bl87 (mentioning restitution, specifically). See, e.g., Cases B61, B70,
B 144, and B156 (discussing return of goods or repayment to victim).
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defendants had "obtained the forgiveness of' victims or family members, and
court decisions explicitly discussed compensation to families as a basis for a
suspended sentence. 119 Although some in China have drawn parallels between
reconciliation in criminal cases and models of restorative justice elsewhere, the
Chinese system relies almost entirely on direct payment to victims and their
families as a direct factor justifying mitigation of a sentence.
Settlement cases were largely made of up cases resulting from traffic
accidents and fights. Because compensation determinations in criminal cases
come through attached civil compensation claims, compensation levels should
correspond to compensation in tort cases. In practice, however, settlement
values ranged widely, and it is difficult to discern whether settlement amounts
correspond to amounts potentially available in tort. The largest settlement, in a
case involving multiple fatalities, was 370,000 yuan. 120 The court found the
defendant to have been drunk and to have fled the scene, which would
potentially have exposed the defendant to a sentence in excess of seven years.
After paying the compensation to the victims' families, the defendant received
only a three-year sentence, which was suspended for five years, resulting in no
prison time. 121 Defendants received suspended sentences in virtually all county
court cases involving settlements.
Yet the number of settlements in the county I studied may actually be low
compared to elsewhere in Henan: settlement rates in criminal cases at some firstinstance courts in Henan reached eighty or ninety percent. 122 One lawyer
commented that the actual practice of settlements in Henan extends far beyond
what is authorized in law: "the reality of practice exceeds real life." 12 3

119. Case Bl.
120. Case B193.
121. Case B193 (demonstrating that the defendant may also have been helped by his status as
deputy director of the local family planning bureau, and as son of a local official).
122. Interview 2012-17.
123.
Interview 2012-7. See also Henan Xinmi Tui Peichang Baozhengfin, Qingzui Xianfan
Jiaoqian Ke Mianyu Pibu (i%#MEfM!$@AifE
T TtA ) [Xinmi,
Henan Adopts Compensation Deposits, Misdemeanor Suspects Can Pay to Avoid Arrest], FAZHI
RIBAO ( $1 H Tv) [LEGAL DAILY] (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/content

i

/2010-08/23/content 2253710.htm (stating that for minor crimes, defendants may be able to provide
a "compensation guarantee payment" to the police and thus avoid being formally arrested by the
procuratorate, and that the policy was the explicit reaction to the overuse of compulsory measures
against defendants charged with minor crimes); Henan Sheng JianchaJiguan Yi Nian Hejie 6433 An
(4 -W
V Aft I1 6 4 3 3
[Henan ProcuratorateSettled 6433 Cases in One Year],
FAZHIRIBAO (fi$1 H Tv) [LEGAL DAILY] (Mar. 28, 2010), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/

&

#

$)

content/2010-04/30/content 2129568.htm (stating that seventy five percent of the cases in Henan in
2009 involved sentences of three years or less; sixty-eight percent of these defendants received a
suspended sentence, a sentence of control or detention, were exempt from criminal punishment, or
were subject only to a fine; the procuracy also reported resolving approximately ten percent of cases
through mediation before going to court, a total of 6433 cases involving 7622 people in 2009);
Henan Geji Fayuan YiNian Tiaojie Jiean 221732 Jian (4 &01 ;- - A f i 5 2 2 17 3 2
ft) [Henan Courts Mediated 221732 Cases in One Year], FAZHI RIBAO (fi$JH Tv.) [LEGAL

DAILY] (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/content/201004/30/content
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My dataset also includes a number of cases in which defendants convicted
of relatively minor crimes did not receive a suspended sentence, apparently at
least in part because the defendant did not reach a settlement with the victim.
Thus, for example, defendant Wang Xisheng was sentenced to a year in prison
following a fight that caused minor injury to a neighbor. The two parties were
unable to reach a settlement and the court sentenced Wang to prison, in contrast
with other cases involving fights in my dataset where the defendants settled and
received only suspended sentences. 124 In one of the two traffic crime cases that
resulted in a prison sentence, defendant Liu Tao failed to come to the immediate
assistance of his alleged victims after an accident that left two people riding an
electric bicycle dead and a third injured, and also failed to compensate his
victims. The court found his conduct involved "particularly bad circumstances,"
thus warranting a five-year jail sentence. 125 The court explicitly stated that the
failure to compensate the victims' families was a factor justifying a heavier
sentence. 126 The other defendant sentenced to prison in a traffic crime case was
a recidivist who received an effective sentence of eight months. All other traffic
crime cases involved both settlement and compensation. 127
Particularly unlucky were those defendants who had spent the proceeds of a
crime and thus were not able to pay restitution. For example, although the
dataset includes a number of cases involving motorcycle thefts where the

m (discussing emphasis on mediation in Henan courts generally and a nearly fifty percent increase in
the percentage of cases mediated); Yang Tao, "Xingshi Hejie" Zhong Faguan Buneng Dang
Heshilao (Mu $ fn V "±
1? T R$
$ ) [Judges Cannot Be the Peacemakers in Criminal
Settlement],
FAZHI
RIBAO
(i$ $1 H T#)
[LEGAL
DAILY]
(Sep.
27,
2012),

http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Frontier of law/content/2012-09/27/content 3872770.htm
(noting
that China's new Criminal Procedure Law restricts the use of mediation in criminal cases to specific
categories and discussing the risk that mediation will be overused or forced on parties by courts
seeking quick resolution of even serious criminal cases); "Xingshi Hejie " Xingui: Furen Ke Jiao
X3X PA ±r ?) [New
Fakuan Qiongren Zhineng Zuolao? (fflJ$ T fn "MQI::
Rules of Criminal Settlement: The Rich Can Pay Fine, While the Poor Can Only Go to Prison?],
FAZHI RIBAO ($1H T ) [LEGAL DAILY] (Sep. 27, 2012), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/commen

tary/content/2012-09/27/content 3873374.htm (discussing concerns that emphasis on settlements in
criminal cases will favor the rich).
124. Case B95.
125. Case B5 (illustrating that the defendant had apparently pledged to compensate a small
amount, 5400 yuan, but had defaulted on compensation payment).
126. Case B5. No provision in the criminal law authorizes the imposition of heavier sentence to
defendants who fail to compensate. In Case 13, the court affirmed that a three-year sentence for a
defendant in a traffic accident. Although the defendant had paid compensation, defendant had
apparently not obtained forgiveness of victim's family. Although defendant requested leniency,
defendant's lawyer contested guilt on appeal. See also Cases B5 and B98 (demonstrating the only
two cases that had no suspended sentence arising from a traffic crime). Cases Bi, B4, B7, B9, B12,
B16, B27, B42, B71, B87, B103, B112, B120, B128, B129, B134, B154, B170, 3180, 3181, B193,
B205, B206, B207, B216, and B220 are examples of cases resulting in suspended sentences.
127. Only Cases B5 and B98 had no suspended sentence in a case arising from a traffic crime.
Cases Bi B4 B7, B9, B12, B16, B27, B42, B71, B87, B103, B112, B120, B128, B129, B134, B154,
B170, 3180, 3181 B193, B205, B206, B207, B216 and B220 were traffic crime cases resulting in
suspended sentences.

Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

18'

Berkeley Journal of InternationalLaw, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 1

2015]

LENIENCY IN CHINESE CRIMINAL LAW?

183

defendants returned the stolen goods and received suspended sentences, it also
includes cases such as that of Hou Yunchang who stole a pig and motorcycle
and wound up in prison, both because he fled after the crime and because he was
apparently unable to pay restitution. 128 In another case involving motorcycle
thefts, two defendants were treated differently because one had sold, and thus
not returned, a stolen motorcycle, while the other defendant had returned all the
stolen motorcycles. 129
Although somewhat less pronounced in influence, intermediate court cases
suggest that settlements are likewise important both in first-instance trials in the
intermediate court and in appeals. Eleven defendants who were tried in the
intermediate court and convicted of murder or of intentional injury leading to
death received either life sentences, suspended death sentences, or fixed terms of
imprisonment after paying compensation to victims' families. In at least one of
these cases the court explicitly stated that it was imposing a life sentence,
presumably instead of death, because the defendant had compensated the
victim's family and had "obtained the understanding" of the family. 130 In
another case, a defendant who killed someone in a fight but confessed and paid
compensation received a fifteen-year sentence, while a defendant in another case
who contested the allegations and failed to pay compensation received life in
prison. 13 1 In a third case, a defendant convicted of the kidnapping and killing of
a child was sentenced to life in prison despite the Criminal Law specifying the
death penalty for a killing in the course of a kidnapping. The court noted that the
defendant had settled and had surrendered. 132
Settlement was also an important factor in cases in which sentences were
revised on appeal to the intermediate court. As discussed below, 27 defendants
(out of a total of 442 defendants in the cases on appeal to the intermediate court)
had their sentences reduced by the intermediate court, mostly because of
settlements subsequent to the initial trial. Judges confirm that settlements may
result in reduced punishment in some serious cases and that settlements of cases
subsequent to first-instance verdicts may lead the intermediate court to revise
sentences on appeal. 133

128. Case B62.
129. Case B19.
130. See Case 114a (explaining that a codefendant received a fixed term sentence because he
paid compensation and assisted in capturing the primary defendant).
131. Cases 127b, 128b.
132. Case I5a. Article 239 of China's Criminal Law states that a defendant who kills another
person in the course of a kidnapping shall be sentenced to death. Criminal Law, supra note 89, art.
239. As Margaret Lewis has noted, a surge in suspended death sentences has in recent years also
resulted in public questioning of whether corruption is playing a significant role in courts' decisions
to grant suspended death sentence instead of the death penalty. Lewis, supranote 85, at 325-26. One
commentator at a presentation of this Article in China noted that victim's families in murder cases
often have the choice of accepting compensation or having the defendant executed.
133. Interview 2012-19.

http://scholarship.1aw.berkeley.edu/bjil/vo133/iSS1/1

188

: Full Issue 33:1

184

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:1

In interviews, judges confirm that compensation is an important factor
determining outcomes, in particular in relatively minor cases, such as traffic
crimes leading to injury, theft, and assault. 134 Compensation claims may be
resolved privately or through the resolution of civil claims attached to criminal
cases. For example, intermediate court judges reported that, in general, roughly
half of their first-instance cases have civil cases attached to them and that half of
these are resolved through settlement. Other cases may be resolved though
settlements outside of court. 135 Cases can be settled at any point in the criminal
process, including after courts have issued their decisions, 136 although in
practice it appears that courts often wait to see if cases are resolved via
reconciliation before issuing their judgments.
Compensation also affects outcomes in capital cases. Lawyers state that in
capital cases, settlement agreements can make the difference between death and
a suspended death sentence 1 37 : to avoid the death penalty, a defendant must pay
compensation. 138 One lawyer directly linked the recent decline in executions in
China and the emphasis on mediating outcomes in criminal cases. 139
Judges (and procurators and police) at times play active roles in settlement
negotiations, 140 reflecting their strong interest in having cases resolved through
payment of compensation. As one judge noted, "we work very hard to try to
resolve cases via settlement." 14 1 Court efforts to settle will often be guided by
the amounts potentially available in civil cases, 142 and courts explain relevant
standards governing compensation in order to persuade victims to accept
compensation. 14 3 Judges say they question victims or their family members to
ensure they are satisfied with compensation agreements and in some cases add
money to the agreed amount. 144 Such efforts are guided by the belief that

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Id.

2012-17.
2012-19.
2012-12; Interview 2012-18.
2012-23.
2013-5.

140.
Interview 2012-6; Interview 2013-11; Chen Ruihua: Xingshi Susong De Sili Hezuo Moshi
( ,gW$ :JJ
[Chen Ruihua: Integration of Private Remedy into Criminal
Litigation],
FAZHI
RIBAO
(
JK
[LEGAL
DAILY]
(Nov.
1,
2010),

http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/fxy/content/20 10-11/01/content_2335275.htm (discussing prevalence
of negotiated outcomes in criminal cases in Beijing and noting success at avoiding petitions;
Xingsufa Shishi Zhong De Zhongdian Nandian Wenti (iiJ
f
) [Key Points
and Difficulties in Application of Criminal Procedure Law], FAZHI RIBAO (
HM
JK) [LEGAL
DAILY] (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Frontieroflaw/content/20 1301/09/content_41
19385 2.htm (discussing preference of procurators and police for mediating criminal cases during
the trial stage).
141. Interview 2013-9.
142. Interview 2012-26.
143. Interview 2013-11.
144. Id.
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settlement works. 145 As another judge noted, settlements reduce contradictions
and the possibility of escalation; thus, judges "want a settlement." 146
Judges describe their roles as neutral actors seeking to ensure that the rights
of victims are protected. Yet, it is clear that in some cases, courts place pressure
on both sides of a case to agree to a mediated outcome. 147 Lawyers contend that
defendants are sometimes under extreme pressure to pay compensation to
victims, with trials delayed to encourage settlement. 14 8 Judges confirm that
courts sometimes pressure defendants to settle, noting that criminal trials can be
delayed for up to two months in cases in which a civil claim is attached to the
criminal case.149 A few of the cases in the dataset involved delayed trials for
minor crimes while a defendant remained in detention, suggesting that the court
was attempting to encourage a settlement. In one case, 150 the defendant was
sentenced to eighteen months in jail for causing an injury in a fight between
neighboring families. That defendant allegedly injured the neighbor by throwing
a brick on his foot. The court initially delayed the trial by two months,
apparently to encourage the two sides to mediate. When they failed to reach an
agreement, the court ordered a relatively modest compensation of 3834 yuan,
but also imposed an eighteen-monthjail sentence.
In the county court the average time from indictment by the procuracy to
court decision was 32.2 days. 151 Twenty-four cases 152 took more than 45 days
from indictment to court judgment; only eleven cases took more than 80 days. In
these eleven cases, nine of the thirteen defendants eventually either paid
compensation or some form of restitution, suggesting that ongoing settlement
negotiations may have played a role in the delays. The court appeared to move
relatively quickly to decide cases when a settlement seemed unlikely or
impossible, with cases not involving a settlement being resolved more quickly

145.
146.

Id.
Interview 2013-2.

147. Xiayi Fayuan Jianli "Qixiang Jizhi" Tigao Zhixing Hejieli Chengxiao
(AEER3t'
WtTFQ'
#$0 [Xiayi Courtto Establish a "Seven Mechanism" to
Improve the Implementation Rate of Paying off a Settlement], SHANGOIU FAYUAN WANG

(Mifr

) [SHANGQIU COURT WEB] (Jul. 13, 2009), http://hnsqzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.ph

p?id=968;

Langzhong Fayuan Suan Hao
"Si Bi Zhang" Cujin Zhixing Hejie
[Langzhong Court Considered "FourAccounts" to Facilitate
ff" Iffw
(/'h7NVW" o
the Implementation of Reconciliation], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (
[AI) [CHINA COURT]

(Aug. 19, 2010), http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=424266;
Qianghua" Zhua Hao Zhixing Hejie (IM[I" Ei'L" #

Pizhou Fayuan "Si Ge
[Pizhou Court "Four

Enhanced" Ensures Effective Enforcement of Settlement], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG (hEARM)

[CHINA COURT] (May 12, 2011), http://old.pz.gov.cn/Htmls/News/mtkpz/JF28BO4NO66X4T60V6.h
tml.

148. Interview 2012-6.
149. Interview 2012-17.
150. Case B115.
151. The fastest case was decided 5 days after the filing of the indictment. The slowest case
took 399 days.
152. Cases 1134, B215, B22, 1112, 1130, 1193, 112, 1163, and 1106.
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than those involving a settlement. The average time from indictment to decision
in cases involving crimes against identifiable victims was 29.1 days for cases
not involving settlements and 37.4 days for those with settlements. In the
intermediate court, the average time from indictment to judgment was longer74 days. Yet some intermediate court cases also moved quickly from indictment
to trial. For example, only 21 days elapsed from indictment to judgment for a
defendant charged with fraudulently raising nearly 3 million yuan in capital. The
defendant, who lacked legal representation, was sentenced to life in prison.
It is also common for cases involving multiple defendants accused of the
same crime to result in different sentences depending on whether the defendants
paid compensation. 153 Defendants who compensate victims often receive
suspended or reduced sentences; those who do not receive prison terms. 154 For
example, a defendant convicted of intentional homicide had his sentence
reduced on appeal from five years to four years after he paid 35,000 yuan in
compensation to the victim's family. The defendant had been part of a group
that went to the victim's home to pressure her to repay a gambling debt. The
victim drank pesticide, killing herself in front of the defendants. The court
affirmed a finding of intentional homicide for two of the defendants, but
accepted one defendant's argument that the sentence should be reduced in light
of the compensation paid and the secondary role played by the defendant in the
crime. 155 In a companion case, 156 three others who were convicted of
participating in the same crime but who failed to pay compensation had their
157
sentences affirmed.
Judges say they consider settlement offers even in cases in which victims
reject such settlements, 158 but it is impossible to verify this from the written
159
judgments. Judges also say they take account of defendants who cannot pay,
although the cases do not provide evidence to support this claim. Judges say
that, in general, defendants will borrow from friends and family in order to come
up with money to pay compensation. 16 0 In some cases courts may also provide
funds to victims' families from court assistance funds to encourage settlements,
in particular where the defendant or defendant's family has tried to settle but
lacked adequate resources. 161 Defendants also sometimes act strategically when

153. Interview 2012-6.
154. Id.
155. Case 1156.
156. Case 114b.
157. See also Case 6c (illustrating that defendants who settled received lighter sentences than
codefendants who did not settle for beating corncob seller after motorcycle crashed on spilled
corncobs).
158. Interview 2012-17.
159. Interview 2013-11 (noting that in cases in which a defendant lacks fund the court will
seek to explain the situation to the victim or victim's family).
160. Interview 2013-11.
161. Interview 2012-17.
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it comes to organizing settlements: in one traffic accident case, the defendant
fled after the accident and then waited to turn himself in until the two families
had reached a settlement. He received a suspended sentence. 162
Cases that were not amicably resolved sometimes resulted in defendants
receiving jail sentences even when they did pay compensation. Defendant Wang
Xisheng was charged with willful injury after he punched his neighbor in the
chest, causing "minor harm." 16 3 Wang did so after his neighbor dug a hole
outside his house into which he fell. Wang agreed to compensate his neighbor
7,000 yuan, an amount approved by the court. Nevertheless, he was sentenced to
a year in prison. The court, while rejecting the victim's demands for additional
compensation, nevertheless decided that Wang deserved a prison sentence-in
contrast to numerous other cases where defendants charged with crimes arising
out of fights received only suspended sentences.
Surrender and confession are also important factors affecting leniency,
although the county court made clear that surrender must be useful to the
authorities and confession must be truthful. Confession is a prerequisite to the
imposition of a suspended sentence. 164 The overwhelming majority of
defendants confessed: 202 of the 273 defendants in the county court confessed at
some point in the process. A small number of cases involved multiple
defendants in which one defendant was treated more harshly than codefendants
because of failure to confess. 16 5 Helping victims after an accident was also a
factor courts considered in imposing a lenient sentence. 166 Informing on others
and providing evidence of other crimes were also useful routes for those seeking
leniency. Failure to surrender or to confess, in contrast, can lead to a heavier
sentence. Thus, for example, a defendant who tried to escape after being
detained was sentenced to four months for a minor crime that otherwise almost
certainly would have resulted in a suspended sentence. 167
Some apparent lenient outcomes may reflect court and procuratorate
attempts to adapt to local customs and expectations. Thus, for example, a
defendant who attacked another person with an axe was prosecuted for
attempted murder but was sentenced at the bottom of the specified range to 144
months in the trial court. On appeal, the intermediate court reduced the sentence
to 72 months. The defendant had acted in response to an attempt by the victim to
"cure [the] defendant's wife by superstitious means." Prior to the attack, the two
had argued with the victim stating that the defendant had offended the heavens

162.
163.
164.
165.
additional
defendant
166.
167.

Case B103.
Case B95.
Interview 2012-26.
Case B373; Case B373. But see Cases 1139, 1113, and B79 (demonstrating that in
cases longer sentences appeared to be based both on failure to settle and on the other
committing additional offenses).
Case B154.
Case B62.
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and was cursed. 168 In another example of both leniency and efforts to reconcile
disputes among neighbors, the intermediate court affirmed a one-year sentence
for a defendant for willful injury. The defendant was apparently a traditional
healer who the court said used "witchcraft" to attempt to remove a serpent that
she said was inside the victim. The victim was suffocated when the defendant
compressed her neck and held her nose closed during the treatment. The
defendant paid more than 100,000 yuan to the victim's family prior to trial. 16 9
The one-year sentence appears low even considering the payment of
compensation.
The cases provide a window into the practice of leniency in Henan that
likely is over- and underinclusive. Many cases settle during the investigation
phase under the guidance of the procuratorate; these cases never proceed to
court and thus do not appear in the dataset. Likewise many traffic cases that
could potentially lead to criminal charges are settled by the police because
charges are dropped once compensation is paid. 170 Procurators say that it is
common to drop charges for minor crimes when the defendant agrees to
compensate the victim. Compensation agreements can also affect the criminal
charge selected by the procuratorate. 171
Yet suspended sentences may not reflect leniency at all: some interviewees
suggested that many suspended sentences reflect cases where defendants should
never have been charged with or convicted of a crime in the first place. Chinese
courts in criminal cases serve almost entirely as fora for determining sentences,
not guilt. Courts are under enormous pressure to convict all defendants, and
suspended sentences may thus be a proxy for cases where there is insufficient
evidence to convict. 172 Although most nonpublic cases involve juveniles, it is
also possible that courts choose not to make certain cases public.
Confession, surrender, and compensation are not the only factors affecting
sentencing. Courts may also consider factors not stated in the opinion. For
example, one judge noted that courts will often consider whether the defendant
has children although the court may not put such reasoning into an opinion. 173
Additionally, suspended sentences may also reflect direct corruption. 174 It is
impossible to know how many such cases occur, but defense lawyers
acknowledge that defendants can sometimes win suspended sentences through

direct payments to judges. 175

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Case 188a.
Case 192a.
Interview 2013-11.
Interview 2013-12.
Interview 2013-2.
Interview 2013-8.
Interview 2012-6.
Id.
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C. Overcriminalizationand State Interests
Despite the official embrace of leniency, the county court decisions also
show that the criminal justice system continues to criminalize a wide range of
minor conduct. Thus while many criminal defendants appear to be treated
leniently, the county cases suggest that the criminal justice system handles a
significant number of primarily civil disputes. Many of the cases appear to
reflect the criminalization of tort disputes or business disputes, perhaps
reflecting the difficulty of winning and enforcing a civil judgment. Hence the
dataset includes numerous cases that involve fights among neighbors resulting in
minor harm-in one case a fight resulting in minor harm to a finger-that
become criminal cases. 176 Such cases largely follow statutory guidelines, which
impose sentences of up to three years for intentional harm resulting in minor
injury. Nevertheless, the large volume of such cases appears in tension with
efforts to mediate minor criminal matters. Settlement is encouraged, but even
very minor crimes remain a concern of the State. Likewise, the cases include
fairly routine traffic accidents-in one case caused by a wheel falling off a carthat are treated as criminal matters. 177 Also, property disputes-in particular
illegal use of land that does not belong to the defendant-were another source of
criminal cases. 17 8 China is not unique in criminalizing such conduct, but the
cases reflect the long reach of the criminal justice system. 179 Procurators
and
lawyers say that it is common for the criminal system to be used to resolve civil
cases-in particular economic cases and disputes among neighbors. 180
The threat of criminal charges is at times used to extract compensation
from an opposing party or used to force those who refuse to comply with civil
cases to do so. This was most clear in a case in which a defendant was convicted
and sentenced to a suspended sentence for refusing to pay a prior civil award for
440,000 yuan resulting from a traffic accident. The court noted that the
defendant had spent money decorating his house and purchasing household
appliances despite claiming to lack resources to pay the judgment. 181
The cases also show that harsh punishments are imposed when core
interests of the State are involved or where there are concerns about repeat or
copycat crimes. Thus, the county court imposed long sentences for creating a tax

176. Case B159.
177. Case B134.
178. Cases B 17, B47, and B63. See also Case 169a, in which a dispute about use of land led to
criminal charges for destruction of property. The court in that case ordered the defendant to pay forty
percent of the victim's damages.
179. The cases also do not include defendants sentenced to reeducation through labor or other
forms of administrative custodial detention.
180. See, e.g., Interview 2013-7 (stating that it is easy to use criminal cases to resolve
economic or business disputes).
181. Case B195.
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fraud scheme, 182 stealing parts from highways, 183 or stealing electrical wires or
electrical installations belonging to the power grid or installations or materials
belonging to telecommunications companies.184 Crimes involving threats of
violence, guns, or trafficking of women and children were treated harshly. 185
One of the longest sentences in the county court was in a case involving
defendants who created a company for the purposes of exporting labor to
Singapore. The scheme involved charging victims a fee in exchange for
promising to arrange work. 186 The primary defendant received an eleven-year
sentence. 187
Those with prior criminal records were likewise treated harshly, virtually
always receiving criminal sentences regardless of the seriousness of the crime
charged. Thus, a defendant in the intermediate court who was convicted of
stealing 200,000 yuan in jewelry received a life sentence despite the fact that
there was no suggestion of violence, apparently because of a prior conviction for
theft. 188
Courts also are careful to ensure that sentences imposed generally exceed
time held in pretrial detention, thus avoiding a suggestion that the procuratorate
or police had erred in ordering that a defendant be detained. All of the 169
county court defendants held in detention for a period prior to trial were found
guilty, and most of them received criminal sentences that were equal to or
greater than the time already served in detention. Yet 85 of these defendants had
their sentences suspended, meaning they likely served no additional time in
detention. Nevertheless, the imposition of a suspended sentence or fine (as
opposed to a nonguilty verdict) also precluded a State compensation claim that
the procuratorate or police had erred in their decisions to detain the defendants.
D. High-ProfileIssues
The cases in this study provide insight into how the criminal justice system
is being used to address a number of contentious social issues, including:
corruption, land disputes, disputes related to social stability, and violent
domestic disputes. They also provide details on crimes charged against women.

182. Case B79 (holding that a defendant is sentenced to six years for selling fake value added
tax certificates).
183. Case B139.
184. Cases B6, B14, and B157.
185. See, e.g., Cases B133 and B2221 (holding that a crime of troublemaking and provocation
for assault in which defendant stole twenty-five yuan deserved a five-month sentence); see also
Cases B90, B32, and B94.
186. The defendants were able to return only ten percent of the money collected.
187. Case B161.
188. Cases 129a (suspended sentence); Case 129b.
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1. Corruptionand FinancialCrimes
Six county court cases involve financial crimes relating to corruption:
bribery, 189 corruption, 190 embezzlement, 19 1 and misappropriation of public
funds. In all but one of the cases, defendants received a suspended sentence. 192
In contrast, a number of defendants who were not State employees received
significant sentences for financial crimes. Seventeen county court cases involved
other forms of financial crime: fraud; 193 contract fraud; 194 credit card fraud; 195
extortion and blackmail; 196 forgery or sale of State certificates or fake tax
invoices; 197 and illegal business activities. 198 Sentences were suspended in only
eight of these cases, with some defendants receiving sentences of up to thirteen
years. Differences in sentencing may reflect underlying provisions in the
Criminal Law and in the amount of money involved: Chinese law links
sentences to the amount involved in financial crimes. A number of the contractfraud and financial-crime cases that resulted in criminal sentences involved large
amounts of money, while the amounts involved in many of the official
corruption cases were relatively small. More serious sentences were imposed in
corruption and embezzlement cases tried in the intermediate court. 199
Nevertheless, the cases suggest the possibility that financial crimes
involving State officials are treated more leniently than those committed by nonState employees and that the criminal justice system is being used to resolve
business disputes. 200 In interviews, lawyers confirm that it is common for

189. Case B70 (holding that a defendant policeman would receive a suspended sentence for
accepting money in exchange for attempting to eliminate a criminal sentence).
190. Case B169 (convicting sanitation bureau head for stealing 30,000 yuan by falsifying
financial statements for his department); Case B123 (defendant adjusted electricity meters to collect
more money).

191. Case B104 (imposing three-year sentences, which were suspended for four years, for
misappropriating 60,000 yuan in public funds); Case B203 (embezzled public funds by stealing from
a rural health fund).
192. The one defendant who did not receive a suspended sentence received a twelve-year
sentence for embezzling more than 100,000 yuan from a local rural health fund. Case B203. The
finding is not surprising: at numerous workshops in China at which I presented this paper there was
general consensus that prior to 2013, officials convicted of corruption and related offenses generally
were treated leniently unless their conduct was extremely serious.
193. Cases B46, B61, 3101, B144, B161, B202, B204, and B214.
194. Cases 310, B88, and B209.
195. Case B23.
196. Cases B40, and B65 (both receiving suspended sentences).
197. Cases B53, B210, and B79.
198. Case B161.
199. See, e.g., Case 16a (imposing a fifteen-year sentence for embezzling 3 million yuan
intended to be used for relocation payments to villagers).
200. Case 14A is another case in which a lower court appeared lenient toward a defendant
charged with corruption. A county court convicted a police officer of abuse of power for extorting
money but then ordered him exempt from punishment because the consequences were slight and the
defendant had been subject to Party discipline. The procuratorate successfully objected and the
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officials to receive comparatively lenient sentences, in particular when funds are
returned. 20 1
Most of the cases studied involve low-ranking officials who received
apparently lenient sentences. But one first-instance intermediate court case
involved the prosecution of a county Party secretary, the highest ranking official
at the county level, on forty-nine corruption counts, totaling more than 5 million
yuan. The defendant, who argued that he acted in the public interest and that the
funds were used to buy gifts for other officials, was sentenced to eighteen
years. 202
2. Land Disputes
A number of cases demonstrated the prevalence of land disputes in rural
China in recent years, in some cases fights resulting from such disputes. 20 3
Three other cases were brought against defendants for illegal occupation or use
of farmland, generally for use of land in ways not approved by the State or for
using land that did not belong to the defendant. 204 For example, two defendants
were prosecuted for illegally selling sand from their land, 20 5 in one case by
digging a hole eleven meters deep. 206 One case involved defendants prosecuted
for beating villagers who refused to cooperate with a relocation order in
conjunction with a land seizure. Defendants were sentenced to thirty months,
with the intermediate court affirming a decision to treat defendants leniently
because they had assisted other investigations. 207
3. Social Stability and Protest
A few cases touched on issues concerning social stability, hinting at local
unrest. One case in the county court involved an attack on a local high school by
villagers, the result of an apparent dispute between two villages. 208 A county

intermediate court imposed a two-year sentence.
201. Interview 2013-7.
202. Cases 121a and B190. See also Case 170a, in which defendants were prosecuted for illegal
detention after a group of villagers blocked access to police seeking to arrest a fellow villager.
Although the defendants prevailed on an initial appeal, on retrial they were once again convicted.
203.
Case B106 (fighting arising from land dispute).
204. Cases 117, B47, and B63.
205.
Cases B17 and B63.
206.
Case B17 (admonishing that the defendant had caused "serious deterioration to
farmland"). In another case, a defendant was convicted of illegal use of farmland after opening a
dairy. Case B47. Numerous other cases resulted from conflicts relating to land disputes. See, e.g.,
Case 17 (convicting defendant of cutting down neighbor's trees after neighbor cut down defendant's
trees following contract dispute over land use rights).
207.
Case 183a.
208. Case B 190. See also Case 170a, in which defendants were prosecuted for illegal detention
after a group of villagers blocked access to police seeking to arrest a fellow villager. Although the
defendants prevailed on an initial appeal, on retrial they were once again convicted.
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court case resulting from a labor dispute ended in convictions for employees
charged with stealing crops. 20 9 In another case, the intermediate court convicted
a defendant for abuse of power for entering into a contract that resulted in
massive financial losses to a hotel. 2 10 The court's opinion noted the deep
unhappiness of the defendant's employees, presumably from the resulting job
losses. The case suggested that the prosecution was at least in part a response to
a fear of labor unrest.
In one case, the intermediate court affirmed a lower court sentence of five
years for extortion. The defendant was unhappy about a separate decision in the
lower court determining the amount of land assigned to the defendant and her
family pursuant to a land use transfer agreement. She told the court that unless it
paid her 1 million yuan, she would go to Beijing to protest. In response, the
procuratorate brought criminal extortion charges. 2 11
Other cases showed how persistent petitioning affects the courts. In a case
that began in 2002, defendants were convicted of disturbing public order after
they allegedly organized a protest at local government offices. They served
thirty months in prison. Upon their release, they began petitioning, seeking to
have the judgment reversed. They eventually succeeded in convincing the
provincial high court to order the case retried-but the county court once again
found them guilty, and the intermediate court affirmed. 2 12
4. Female Defendants and Crimes Within the Family
Court opinions provide only limited information about individual
defendants: age, gender, and in some cases, education level and employment
status. In the county court, 27 of the 273 defendants were women. 2 13 In the
intermediate court, 72 of 530 defendants were women, including 9 defendants in
first-instance cases. The limited sample size makes generalizations about types
of crimes committed or sentencing of women difficult. Women were prosecuted
for crimes ranging from organized robbery to forgery to intentional harm and
trafficking or abduction of women or children. Women involved in serious
crimes, such as organized robbery, received sentences along the lines of their
male accomplices or counterparts given the crimes charged, although there is
some evidence that women were detained for shorter periods pretrial. Women
involved in trafficking cases received harsher sentences than their male
accomplices, but courts found that the women were the primary culprits in these

209.
Case B183.
210. Case 126.
211. Case 168 (demonstrating that, as the defendant had already been to Beijing to protest three
previous times, she almost certainly drew the ire of the local court).
212. Case B 190. See also Case I70a, in which defendants were prosecuted for illegal detention
after a group of villagers blocked access to police seeking to arrest a fellow villager. Although the
defendants prevailed on an initial appeal, on retrial they were once again convicted.
213. All but one of the remaining defendants were male; one defendant was a corporation.
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cases, actually selling the women and children, as opposed to their male
accomplices who received only suspended sentences for introducing the
defendant women to buyers.
Tables 5 and 6 list crimes with which women were charged in the county
court and in first-instance intermediate court cases.
TABLE

5:

FEMALE DEFENDANTS IN THE COUNTY COURT BY CRIME
SENTENCED

Defendants

Cases

Organizedl robbery ,t\ %~
Theft (&G
Forgery and/or sale of state authorities'31

4

1

)

Case Type

(
j@I )
Abdutction and tmifficking- of w~omen(ti
Intentional injury

Concealment of illegal gains (tt

2
FMJSE$Wpfr

Abductin and trafficking- of cildren
Bigamy (ig

tii

2
4

4

L

y)1
4%Y $ l

Distuirbance of the pce

)
111
Gamibling (1t

Fraud (

1)1

t

Illegal sales of invoices (J

)1

d Pi&T'

1

)

Mlisaippropriaitioni of puiblic funids
Traffic accident (RAME-5
Total

2

21

Note: "Defendants" refers to the nunmber of defendants charged with a particular
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted

multiple times.
"Cases" refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged.
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.
TABLE 6: FEMALE DEFENDANTS IN FIRST-INSTANCE TRIALS IN THLE
INTERMEDIATE COURT

Crime

0Cedit caIrd frauid d(l
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1

1

WA 1

1

1

Illegal manufacturing of explosives (jM$$Ij

Total
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2),

15

10

Note: "Defendants" refers to the number of defendants charged with a particular
crime. Defendants who are charged with more than one crime are counted
multiple times.
"Cases" refers to the number of cases in which a particular crime was charged.
Cases with multiple charges are thus counted multiple times.
A few cases likely reflect gender issues or potential bias. One female
defendant was convicted of the crime of bigamy and sentenced to six months in
prison after she began living with a man other than her husband. 2 14 She argued
that she had done so only after her husband had an affair with another woman.
The criminalization of a routine domestic dispute strongly suggests that the
criminal system was used to settle personal scores to the detriment of the female
defendant.
The dataset also confirms that courts are lenient in their handling of
intrafamily crimes, including spousal killings. In one county court case, the
court convicted the defendant of negligently killing a woman following a
domestic argument. 2 15 The defendant and the victim were living together, and
the victim, who was married to another man, suffered from mental illness. The
court reported that the two argued after drinking. The defendant left the woman
to sleep on a concrete floor in an unheated room while wearing only her
underwear and a coat. When she froze to death, the defendant received a sixyear sentence. The case was the only nontraffic accident case involving the
death of a victim tried in the county court. All other cases involving death of the
victim were treated more seriously and thus were tried in the intermediate court.
Similar trends appear in the intermediate court cases. In another case, a
defendant who killed his wife received a suspended death sentence. The court's
opinion emphasized the defendant's unhappiness in his marriage, perhaps
providing a basis for avoiding a death sentence. 2 16 Another defendant who

214. China's Criminal Law criminalizes cohabitation with someone other than one's spouse,
but it provides that charges may only be brought by a private complaint.
215.
Case B167.
216.
Case 13a. The case had been decided twice previously by the intermediate court; each time
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killed his wife was convicted of intentional injury, not murder, and was
sentenced to just under ten years. 2 17 In interviews, judges and lawyers confirm
that serious crimes that occur within families, most notably the killing of a
spouse, are treated leniently, with the death penalty virtually never imposed. 2 18
Not all assailants were male. One woman was convicted of homicide in the
intermediate court for killing her husband by setting fire to a building and
locking him inside. The defendant argued that she had intended to burn down
the home of a woman she believed was having an affair with her husband. The
court imposed a suspended death sentence, stating that it was acting leniently
because the defendant had surrendered. But the court also argued that further
leniency was not warranted, in part because the defendant failed to provide any
evidence of an actual affair 2 19 -despite the fact that the killing had taken place
in the other woman's home.
E. Lawyers and Legal Arguments
Few of the defendants in the county court had lawyers or other legal
representatives. This observation is not surprising: the lack of lawyers in
criminal cases has been widely noted. Nevertheless, these cases show that it is
common for defendants to be convicted with no legal representation. Also, the
cases describe the types of arguments made by defendants and their lawyers at
trial and on appeal.

it was remanded for retrial by the provincial high court. It appears that the defendant had settled with
the victim's family, as the family had dropped their civil case as the case proceeded.
217.
Case I4c. In contrast, a defendant convicted of intentional homicide for choking his
girlfriend to death received a suspended death sentence. Case 120. The fact that death-penalty cases
are not made public makes comparisons difficult, but the apparent trend of avoiding death sentences
in such cases is consistent with observations from local lawyers. In another case a defendant
received a suspended death sentence for the intentional killing of his wife. The defendant explicitly
argued that he should be treated leniently because the murder took place in a domestic dispute. Case
13a; see also Case 140 (imposing fifteen-year sentence for killing brother in a fight, after the lawyer
argued for leniency because it was a family dispute, and after the victims' family argued for
leniency). Only one appeal to the intermediate court appeared to involve a domestic dispute. Case
1141. In that case, the defendant's husband assaulted his father-in-law, who had come following a
fight between the husband and wife. Id. The victims appealed, arguing that compensation was too
low and that the sentence was too short. Id. The procuratorate, however, did not participate in the
appeal, suggesting a reluctance to become more deeply involved in the case. Id. In another appeal
that reflected the interaction of gender roles and traditional values in the countryside, the court
affirmed sentences of up to three years for robbery for a woman and her two sons after they
allegedly detained and demanded money from their daughter/sister's boyfriend. Case 1103. They
argued that he had forced them to lose a bride price by having sex with his girlfriend-and thus
should pay compensation as a result. Id. Other crimes of passion likewise appeared to receive
relatively lenient treatment. See, e.g., Case 147b (imposing fifteen-year sentence for willful injury for
killing in a fight, where defendant, who had a prior record, suspected victim was having an affair
with his girlfriend).
218. Interview 2012-17.
219.
Case 19b.
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Of the 273 defendants in the county court, only 48 defendants had a legal
representative of any kind. Three defendants were represented by basic-level
legal workers, 220 and an additional 3 were represented by family members. The
remaining 42 defendants were represented by lawyers.
Representation rates in first-instance cases in the intermediate court were
higher, reflecting the more serious charges faced by defendants in such cases.
Of the 67 first-instance defendants, 50 were represented at trial; 49 of these were
represented by lawyers. 22 1 Rates of representation were much higher in the most
serious cases. All of the 9 defendants sentenced to suspended death sentences
had lawyers; 15 of the 20 defendants sentenced to life in prison had lawyers. 222
Cases on appeal to the intermediate court had lower rates of representation:
only 123 of the 442 defendants in cases on appeal to the intermediate court had
legal representation detailed in the court opinions. 223
Table 7 lists the cases by crime charged in which defendants in the county
court were represented by lawyers. Table 8 presents similar data for the
intermediate court.
TABLE

7: COUNTY

COURT CASES WITH LEGAL REPRESENTATION

Crime

Defendants

Cases

Theft(tf )9
Traffic accidentT
-A~4
)77
Conicea11lmet of illega lis (tii~BB ~PT

4

4

Dissemination of obscene materials (-1 i

4

1

4

4

3

2

tt

1

Intentlionllijuy i
sale of fake

{49 fA

and substandard

)

Production and
products (1f

220. Basic level legal workers are State-licensed paraprofessionals, generally with limited legal
training. Basic-level legal workers are authorized to represent clients in civil cases; they are not
permitted to represent clients in criminal cases.
221. The remaining defendant was represented by a family member.
222. See, e.g., Case 16 (imposing against a woman, who was not represented by lawyer, a
sentence of life in prison for drug trafficking); Case 19 (imposing against a defendant with no lawyer
a sentence of life in prison for defrauding 2.92 million yuan). The 1996 Criminal Procedure Law
mandated legal representation only in cases in which a defendant faced a potential death sentence or
was blind, deaf, mute, or a minor. 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 6, art. 34.
223. The cases specified that 128 defendants had legal representation, while 238 lacked
representation For an additional 86 defendants, the opinions provided no information. It is thus
likely that the actual number with some form of legal representation was higher than 128-but
nevertheless still significantly below half of the cases. Of 21 defendants in rehearing cases, 11 had
legal representation
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Frauid (W 1)

2

Abduction and tmfficking of children

Bigamyin
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)L

(

1

k)

Contract fraud

1

Distirbance of the peace
Embezzlement (

1

( l#5`$i)

IR%i

1)

Extortionamd blackmail ()
Falsely issuingW1
exclusive value-added tax invoices

1

11

Gamblingo (Il'[ t

1iD;
Igl possession of guns (4I

1

1

Illegal business act

WA1

1

Destruictioni of electric equtipmmnt(tT

j

11

Refusal to execute court decision1

Toail

043

Note: Total number of cases with legal representation is 41. Two cases that
involved multiple charges are counted twice under "cases." Defendants are listed
by the most serious crime charged.
TABLE 8: LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN FIRST-INSTANCE INTERMEDIATE
COURT CASES

Crime
Note 'PTotlnmehfcsswt ea epeetto

Defendants

Cases

1

1

s4.Tocssta

Defendants
with Legal
Rep?

Cdit card fraud31

Selling counterfeit money (MtINt1

11

Con1tract frauid

1

tFi)22

2

Robberc(&ifD5
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9
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Rceipt f'raud (1t43
)

Harboring criminals

60

11

Kidnal~pping
Fraud (11)

11

Dig traffickingo (Mt
~~ 42

3

Illegall manuf1il'Iatrin]of

Toail

.

Corruption ( F61

Loani frauid
[It~
Fraudulent raising of capital

(3jg

11

e1xplosives

3I.
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0

46

61

The county court cases also show that defendants and, where represented,
their lawyers, were rarely effective when they contested guilt.224 Lawyers
represented defendants in only five of the nine cases in which defendants
contested guilt. 225 In only one county case did the court indicate that it was
accepting a defendant's argument regarding guilt: in that case the court accepted
the defendant's argument that the evidence provided failed to support the
procurator's claim that the defendant had participated in one of four alleged
thefts (the defendant was sentenced for the three other thefts). 2 26 The court
rejected defense arguments in the other eight cases in which a defendant or a
lawyer contested guilt.
Lawyers in Henan say that courts will generally, but not always, mention
defense arguments in opinions. 22 7 Thus, it is possible that some defense
arguments are not reflected in the court opinions. Nevertheless, it is clear from
the cases that acknowledging guilt is by far the most comimon strategy.
The outcomes in the cases reflect a fact that is widely known: winning a
nonguilty verdict is nearly impossible. No defendants in the county court cases
received nonguilty verdicts. Three out of more than four hundred defendants in
the intermediate court cases (including appeals and first-instance trials) received
nonguilty verdicts. In one case, the intermediate court reversed a conviction by a

224. Chinese criminal procedure does not bifurcate determinations of guilt and sentencing.
Because a defendant generally must admit guilt in order to obtain leniency, defendants thus face the
choice of contesting guilt and forgoing arguments for leniency or admitting guilt and arguing for
lenency.
225.
Cases B5, B6, B20, B6 1, B 161, B 195, and B209.
226.
Case B26. A codefendant was convicted of all four of the thefts.
227. Interview 20 12-4.
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lower court of a local village committee for illegal occupation of farmland. On
appeal, the intermediate court found that criminal liability could not be imposed
on the village committee. The intermediate court affirmed criminal judgments
against the farmers who actually illegally occupied the land. In a second case,
the intermediate court affirmed a nonguilty decision from a lower court in a
malicious accusation case. Yet the case was a claim filed by a private individual,
not the procuratorate, and thus did not reflect on the work of the procuratorate.
In a third case, a trial court had acquitted defendants of intentional assault; on
appeal, in response to a procuratorate's objection, the court vacated and
remanded. No first-instance trials in the intermediate court resulted in nonguilty
verdicts. In interviews, judges and lawyers confirm the lack of nonguilty
verdicts in criminal cases in Henan. 228
County court judgments almost always convicted defendants of the exact
crimes charged by the procuratorate, differing from procuratorate charges in
only two cases. In both cases the court convicted the defendant of an additional
charge not alleged by the procuratorate. 22 9 The intermediate court likewise
convicted the defendant of the exact crime charged by the procuratorate in all
sixty-four first-instance cases for which data are available. Yet contesting guilt
may not be fruitless. Judges and lawyers also acknowledge that they have other
strategies to deal with cases they view as incorrectly decided or lacking
evidence. Judges say that they will not rule against the procuratorate because
doing so would affect the career development of both procurators and police
involved in the case. Instead, courts will "communicate [with the procuratorate]
and work it out" if they find problems in cases. 230 Courts may also impose
suspended sentences or exempt defendants from punishment in order to avoid
finding a defendant not guilty. 23 1 Judges acknowledge mediating outcomes even
in cases where there is insufficient evidence to convict. 2 32 In other cases they

228. Interview 2013-2 (stating that winning a nonguilty verdict is impossible, but that in some
cases lawyers nevertheless have no option but to try).
229.
Case B23 (adding a charge of credit-card fraud to procuratorate charge of concealment of
illegal gains); Case B80 (adding a charge of theft to procuratorate charge of illegal logging).
230. Interview 2012-11; see also Interview 2012-4 (noting that courts are generally reluctant to
offend the procuratorate).
231. Interview 2012-7; Interview 2012-10.
232. Interview 2012-26. For discussion of the issue, see Liu Wei, Wuzui Panjueli Qudi De
Beimian (5
It
(Lf)
[Behind Low Rate of Non-Guilty Cases], MINZHU YU FAZHI
SHIBAO

(i4t

gi)

[DEMOCRACY

AND

LEGAL

SYSTEM

NEWS]

(Oct.

29,

2012),

http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/minzhuyufazhishibao/fanfu/html/1248/2012-10-29/content-552683.html
(stating that court and procuracy evaluation standards directly overturn the presumption of innocence
because they result in avoidance of nonguilty verdicts); Zhu Xiaoding, Shuzi Kan Zhongguo: Basan
Nian

Xingshi Panjue Yu Wuzui Xuangao
[Look at China through Numbers:
Criminal Cases and Nonguilty Cases in the SPC's Annual Report Since 1983], SOHU BOKE

(

(r

Yilai

Zuigao Fayuan Baogao Zhong

[1U:JAESJG

De

j

(419t#) [SoHU BLOG] (Mar. 20, 2012), http://yeyuduxingzhe.i.sohu.com/blog/view/208173345.ht
m (arguing that the nonguilty rate is a measure of courts' independence and noting that since 2009
the Supreme People's Court has stopped disclosing the number of people found not-guilty in its
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may reduce a sentence on appeal to time served. For example, in one case the
intermediate court initially remanded a conviction for illegal manufacture of
explosives. On appeal from the trial court for a second time, the court reduced
the sentence from seventy-two to twenty-one months, effectively the time
already served. 233
Some cases in which evidence against the defendant is weak are never
resolved. One Henan lawyer described a case that was vacated and sent back for
retrial twice. The lower court never reheard the case; instead, the defendant was
released on bail and no further action was taken in the case. 234 Another lawyer
stated that defendants prevail with nonguilty arguments only when they are
already on bail or in cases filed by private parties (as opposed to the
procuratorate). 2 35 Other concerns also impact courts' reluctance to issue
nonguilty verdicts: judges may be worried about protests from victims' families
in cases in which they issue not guilty verdicts, 236 may be concerned that judges
may be blamed if the procurator files an objection to the decision resulting in the
verdict being changed, 2 37 or may be concerned about potential State
compensation claims from the acquitted defendant. 238
Lawyers also note that it is often hard to contest guilt because many
defendants have confessed prior to the intervention of lawyers. 239 In such cases,
lawyers who pursue a nonguilty defense risk being targeted for prosecution
under Article 306 of China's Criminal Law. Lawyers have no space to make
independent assessments of the merits of a nonguilty defense because their
clients have generally already been pressured into acknowledging their guilt. 240
As one lawyer commented, "once you are at court it is too late." 24 1 Lawyers

annual Work Report); Morang "Wuzui Panjue" Qinzhou Jiancha Jiguan Shenpan Jiandu
(Ri"
I
"
J
g
ff)
[Don't Let
"Nonguilty Decisions" Circumvent
ProcuratorateSupervision], ZHONGGUO CAIXUN WANG (F1P[A)Qf*) [CAIXUN] (Jul. 10, 2012) (on

file with author) (noting procuracy concerns that a nonguilty verdict will affect their evaluation and
will have negative social effects); Chehui Gongsu Zai Woguo Lifa Ji Sifa Shiwu Zhong De
Zhuangkuang (J
&iERQ TW2 g
)
[The Situation of Withdrawal of
Prosecutionin Legislation and Adjudication in Our Nation], FAZHI WANG (@$IJA) [LEGAL DAILY]

(Oct. 6, 2008), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/fxy/content/2008-06/10/content875885.htm (stating
that any case in which a court proposes to find a defendant nonguilty must be submitted to court
adjudication committees, that courts will consult with procuratorates in advance of any such
decision, and that procuratorates will in practice withdraw a case prior to a court issuing a nonguilty
decision).

233.
Case I75a. Defendants had argued that they did not know how the fertilizer they were
grinding would be used. The court found they were merely accessories to the crime.
234. Interview 2012-6.
235. Interview 2012-28.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Interview 2012-10.
239. Interview 2012-7.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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also say they need to be careful in criminal cases to avoid becoming potential
targets of criminal sanctions themselves. 242 They thus rarely present new
evidence or seek out additional evidence; doing so is too dangerous. 24 3 The
general environment for lawyers is also widely viewed as having deteriorated in
recent years, making lawyers less likely to take on difficult criminal cases.244
Constraints on lawyers likely also increase the pressure on defendants to agree
to settlements.
Yet there were also a few cases in which lawyers appeared to mount
spirited defenses. In one case, a defendant was sentenced to thirteen years for
theft of 90,000 yuan from an office during a break-in. On appeal of a second
trial in the case, the defendant's lawyer argued that the defendant's confession
resulted from torture and stated that the court should follow the presumption of
innocence. The court rejected the argument, affirming the sentence, arguing that
the defendant showed no physical evidence of torture. 24 5 In another case, a
lawyer argued, unsuccessfully, that his client was denied access to counsel in the
trial court. 246
There is substantial debate about the effectiveness of hiring lawyers, both
in China generally and in Henan. Lawyers and academics note that procurators
and judges will sometimes threaten defendants with longer sentences if they hire
a lawyer, will pressure defendants to settle cases absent a lawyer rather than
going to trial, 247 or will offer lighter sentences if the accused do not hire a
lawyer. 248 As one lawyer noted, lawyers make procurators' jobs harder, and
procurators are likely to try to dissuade defendants from hiring lawyers in
complex or problematic cases. 249 Some judges likewise say that hiring lawyers
can sometimes result in worse outcomes for defendants. 250
Yet lawyers also argue that they can add value by arguing for leniency and
facilitating negotiations with courts and procuratorates. 2 51 Lawyers state that in
serious cases, pleading for leniency (rather than contesting guilt) can mean the
difference between life and death. 252 In contrast, judges argue that lawyers are
not as important to courts as are institutional dynamics in affecting outcomes.
As one judge explained, judges are already under enormous pressure to avoid
242. Interview 2012-20.
243. Interview 2013-2.
244. Interview 2012-28.
245. Case 118A.
246. See Case 141a. In that case, the intermediate court said that the defendant had clearly
stated that she did want to be represented by a lawyer. The woman was convicted of threatening a
victim and her parents after her son allegedly committed rape.
247. Interview 2012-1.
248. Interview 2012-7.
249. Interview 2012-28.
250. Interview 2012-11.
251. Interview 2012-5.
252. Interview 2012-5; Interview 2013-4.

Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository,

2015

207

Berkeley Journal of InternationalLaw, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 1

2015]

LENIENCY IN CHINESE CRIMINAL LAW?

incorrect decisions; lawyers' arguments thus
how courts handle cases. 253 Yet other judges
in persuading their clients to settle cases. As
not trust judges. Lawyers therefore can be
settle. 254

203

play a marginal role in affecting
noted that lawyers can be helpful
one judge noted, parties often do
useful in persuading parties to

In Henan, as elsewhere in China, lawyers continue to find it extremely
difficult to access their clients. 255 It is common, say lawyers, to be denied even
the limited access to their clients permitted under the 1996 Criminal Procedure
Law. 256 Local authorities largely ignore the provisions in the Lawyers Law that
grant additional access, with some detention facilities in Henan posting signs
that explicitly state that they follow the Criminal Procedure Law and not the
Law on Lawyers, which prior to 2013 gave lawyers increased access to their
clients compared to the Criminal Procedure Law. 257 Conversations between
clients and lawyers are monitored: as one lawyer noted, the most important role
of lawyers "is to comfort" their clients. 2 58 Likewise lawyers comment that it
remains extremely difficult for them to access witnesses or documentary
evidence. 2 59 A nonparty witness appeared to testify in court in only one case in
the dataset. All other cases that involved witness testimony in court were cases
in which the witness was also a victim seeking compensation.

253.
254.
255.

Interview 2012-19.
Id.
For a general discussion of the challenges facing criminal defense lawyers, see generally

Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, Political Liberalism and PoliticalEmbeddedness: Understanding
Politics in the Work of Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 831, 839-44

(2011).
256. Interview 2012-20; Interview 2012-28.
257. Interview 2012-7. Prior to the 2012 revision of China's Criminal Procedure Law, a
conflict existed between article 33 of the Lawyers Law (adopted in 2007) and article 96 of the
Criminal Procedure Law (adopted in 1996). The Criminal Procedure Law originally provided access
to a client only after the procuratorate brought formal charges; in contrast the revised Lawyers Law
granted access as soon as a defendant was subject to any compulsory measure. The Lawyers Law
also provided that lawyers could meet defendants without being monitored; the 1996 Criminal
Procedure Law stated that authorities could monitor such meetings. Revisions to Criminal Procedure
Law and the Lawyers Law in 2012 made the two laws consistent, largely adopting the prior
provisions of the Lawyers Law. Du Feijin et al., Weile Gongzheng Gaoxiao He Quanwei

(

]TRIERm~'tit)

[PEOPLE'S

COURT

[ForFairness, Efficiency, and Authority], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (Al{k)
NEWS]
(Oct.
9, 2012), http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/html/2012-

10/09/content 51765.htm (detailing the prior conflict between the Criminal Procedure Law and the
Lawyers Law); Yuan Dingbo, Liushi Fa Yu Xingshi Susong Fa Chongtu Cheng Yixie Difang Ban'an
Jiguan Huxiang Tuiwei Liyou (
J
[Conflict
between Lawyers Law and Criminal Procedure Law Has Become Local Authorities' Excuse for
Shirking Responsibilities], FAZHI RIBAO (@gI JHJK) [LEGAL DAILY] (May 26, 2009),

http://fzzx.gansudaily.com.cn/system/2009/05/31/011115445.shtml
(detailing
problems
in
implementing provisions in the Lawyers Law governing access of lawyers to their clients while in
detention).

258.
259.

Interview 2012-28.
Id.
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F. Appeals andRehearings
Outcomes of appeals to the intermediate court suggest that the court is far
more active in reviewing lower court decisions than is commonly assumed to be
the case of appellate courts in China. Yet the cases also confirm many of the
widely recognized problems that exist with appellate review of criminal cases. A
total of 442 defendants appealed to the intermediate court in 2010 or had their
cases appealed by the procuratorate or victims. Of these, 86 had their cases
vacated and remanded for trial, 28 had their sentences lowered, and 3 had their
sentences increased. An additional 10 defendants had no change to their
sentence but had civil compensation claims either remanded or revised. 260
Taken together, the cases suggest that the intermediate court is adjusting
outcomes or remanding cases for retrial in nearly one-third of the cases. This
figure is far higher than is commonly assumed to be the case in criminal cases in
China or the estimate of ten to twenty percent given in interviews. 26 1
Many cases involved appeals by multiple parties, including victims
(plaintiffs in civil compensation cases) and the procuratorate. Table 9 lists the
total number of defendants who had their cases appealed, by party filing the
appeal. Table 10 sets forth outcomes on appeal.
TABLE

9: APPEALS

FILED BY DEFENDANTS, VICTIMS, AND PROCURATORATE

Number

Percent of
Total

Defendant

254

Plaintiff (Victim)

32

7.2

Procuiratorate

9

2.0

Defendant and Plaintiff (Victim)

35

7.9

.

Party Bringing the Appeal

260.

See, e.g., Case 165 (affirming sentence but increasing compensation to victim's family).

261.

Interview 2012-19; see also "Tongyi Ershen Gaipan Biaozhun" De Diaoyan Baogao

(gk-Z'i&#Jttff" ~iti)WFfE) [Report on Unifying the Standardfor Adjusting and Remanding
Appeals], GUANGDONG FAYUAN WANG

(f(f@$kA

[GUANGDONG COURT NET] (Mar. 20, 2012),

http://www.gdcourts.gov.cn/gdcourt/front/front!content.action?lmdm=LM53&gid=2012032002223
7085591 (reporting that nationwide between 2005 and 2007 on average 14% of appeals were
)

adjusted and 7.l1% were remanded); Woguo Wunian Lai Gong 90,000 Yu Jian Xingshi ErshenAnjian
Bei Yifa Gaipan Huo Fahui Chongshen (RTEI-t1#9
[90,000 CriminalAppeal Cases Were Adjusted or Remanded During the Past Five Years], XINHUA
WANG (#fr$/ [XINHUA NEWS NET] (Oct. 26, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-

10/26/content 10254795.htm (reporting that between 2003 and 2008, 90,000 out of 470,000
criminal appeal cases were adjusted or remanded in China); Guangzhou Zhongyuan Xing Erting
Xingshi
Ershen
Anjian
Gaipan,
Fahui
Chongshen
Qingkuang
Fenxi
(J I
FMiflFC
itigi$g{4ry§l
'aI~2fR)5E ) [Analysis ofRemanded and Changed Cases
in Guangzhou Intermediate Court Second Criminal Division], ZHONGGUO XINGSHI FALD WANG
( 1'DJiWFt
[CHINA CRIMINAL LAW NET], http://www.lw315.com/ShowArticle.shtml?ID=201

#J)

013121312166297.htm (reporting that between 2002 and 2004, Guangzhou Intermediate Court
adjusted 11.48% and remanded 2.75% of 1054 criminal appeals).

Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository,

2015

209

Berkeley Journal of InternationalLaw, Vol.

2015]

33, Iss. 1 [2015],

Art. 1

LENIENCY IN CHINESE CRIMINAL LAW?

205

Defenidant and Procniratorate

9

2.0

Plaintiff (Victim) and Procuratorate

1

0.2

Defeiinat, Plaintiff (Victim),and
Procuratorate

1

0.2

Not applicable

101

22.9

Total

4 42

100

Note: "Not applicable" reflect cases with multiple defendants where one or more
defendants did not appeal. In cases where multiple defendants did appeal, all
defendants that appealed were counted in the "Defendant" row. In cases
concerning multiple defendants where the procuratorate appealed, the
"Procuratorate" row reflects the number of defendants for whom the
procuratorate launched the appeal.
TABLE 10: OUTCOMES ON APPEAL (SECOND INSTANCE DEFENDANTS ONLY)

Outcome

Number of
defendants

Percent
of total

Affirmed

244

55.

Vacated and remanded for retrial

87

19.7

Reduced the criminal sentence

2.3

In1creaIsed the Criminal1 sentence

30.7-

Changed the applied law but sentence afflirned

1.1

Criminal case affirmed but the attached civil
compensation case vacated and remanded for
retrial
Criminal case affirmed but attached ci il
compensation amount increased
Reversed (Defendant acquitted)

6

1.4

3

0

Not applicable

65

14.

Total defendants

442

100

0.

Note: "Not applicable" refers to circumstances where a case had multiple
defendants, one or more of whom did not appeal. As a result, the trial verdict
against these defendants was effectively unchanged. This number is lower than
the number of defendants coded as "not applicable" in Table 9: Appeals Filed by
Defendants, Victims, and Procuratorate because in certain appeal decisions,
particularly those where the criminal case was vacated and remanded, defendants
who did not appeal benefited from the appeal of their codefendant.
As is standard practice in appellate review in China, court decisions
vacating and remanding lower court judgments never stated the specific reasons.
Instead, appellate decisions indicate only whether the problem was with the
evidence (generally by stating that the "evidence was unclear"), the procedure,
or the application of law. The majority of the decisions remanding cases in my
dataset simply stated that "the facts are unclear." Appellate courts often, but not
always, follow up such decisions with either an internal, nonpublic letter to the
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lower court regarding the specific problems in the case or with a telephone call
that explains the reason for reversal. 262
As noted above, many of the cases in which the intermediate court changed
outcomes on appeal were modest changes to civil compensation claims attached
to criminal cases. Judges note that the largest category of cases that are changed
on appeal arise from settlements reached after the conclusion of the firstinstance trial. 263 Seven appellate decisions made explicit reference to the
payment of compensation as a basis for a reduction in sentence on appeal.264
Other cases changed on appeal involved defendants who paid fines or restitution
subsequent to the original sentence. 265
Changes on appeal are not always in favor of defendants. Indeed, appealing
can in some cases be dangerous for defendants. In one intermediate court case,
the defendants were charged with illegal manufacture and sale of explosives. 266
Defendants appealed a county court judgment imposing sentences of ten and
four years on the two primary defendants; the procuratorate did not appeal. The
appellate court vacated and remanded the decision. On retrial the case was
assigned to a different court, which increased the sentences to twelve and ten
years. The appellate court then affirmed. 267
Appellate courts may also impose longer punishments than those imposed
in the trial court in response to an appeal by the procuratorate or in a retrial, or
zaishen proceedings. Sixteen of the appellate cases explicitly involved kangsu,
or "objections," filed by the procuratorate either alone or alongside an appeal
filed by a defendant or victim challenging a compensation award. In eight of
these cases only the procuratorate appealed. The intermediate court increased

262. Interview 2012-19.
263. Interview 2012-19.
264. Cases 1156, Ild, 1133, 1144a, 179, 183, and 113b. In Case 179 the reference was indirect:
the court noted that subsequent to the original court decision, the victim forgave the defendant and
withdrew her civil claim. Case 179. The lower court had ordered defendant to pay 3255 yuan in
compensation, but the defendant's family subsequently paid 14,000 yuan. Id. The victim then
requested that the court treat the defendant leniently. See also Case 135 (vacating and remanding
decision in traffic-accident case after lower court imposed three-year sentence despite settlement of
civil compensation claim and the fact defendant took victim to the hospital following the accident).
Sometimes the adjustment is minor. See Case 113b (demonstrating a minor adjustment where
defendant had a prior record, reducing sentence from 210 months to 204 months on appeal following
the payment of compensation).
265. See, e.g., Case 119. In that case, defendant paid a fine and returned stolen goods after a
conviction in county court; the appellate court reduced the sentence from two years and three months
to fifteen months, exactly the time already served.
266.
Case 149.
267. Although Article 190 of the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law stated that an appellate court
could not increase a defendant's sentence absent an appeal filed by a procuratorate, the restriction
did not apply to first-instance courts retrying a defendant following a reversal and remand. The 2012
Criminal Procedure Law removes this loophole, stating that on remand a trial court may only
increase a sentence where the procuratorate brings new criminal charges. 2012 Criminal Procedure
Law, supra note 6, art. 226.
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the defendant's sentence in three of these eight cases, affirmed the decision in
three cases, and vacated and remanded the remaining two cases to the trial court.
In all three cases in which the intermediate court increased a sentence its
reasoning was exactly in line with the procuratorate's argument. Thus, for
example, the intermediate court increased a defendant's sentence from six to
twelve months for the crime of concealing 18,000 yuan in stolen property; the
court stated that the original sentence was "inappropriate." 268 In a child
trafficking case the intermediate court imposed a five-year sentence on a
defendant who had received only a suspended sentence at trial. 269
Judges say that many kangsu petitions come at the request of victims or
their families who object to the sentence but who cannot directly appeal the
sentence. 270 Under the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law, victims could appeal a
compensation award in their status as plaintiffs in an attached civil
compensation case but could not appeal the actual sentence; the same is true
under the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law. One of the objections filed by the
procuratorate was in direct response to complaints from the victim's family: the
court increased a sentence from thirteen to fifteen years for a defendant who
killed another man in a fight. The court noted that the defendant failed to
compensate the victim's family and did not "obtain the family's forgiveness,"
and thus the sentence in the lower court was too light. 27 1 In an additional three
cases involving four defendants, the intermediate court vacated and remanded
lower court decisions following a procuratorate objection to the lower court
decision. 272 One such case was a rare lower court acquittal of a defendant in an
intentional injury case. The intermediate court remanded, finding the facts
unclear, following an objection to the sentence from the procuracy and an appeal
of the failure to award compensation by the victim. 273 Although not technically
an acquittal, another remand occurred in a case in which the lower court had
imposed no prison sentence on a defendant convicted of fraud. 274
268.
Case 13b.
269.
Case 129. The court found that the defendant had not merely purchased trafficked
children, but had actually engaged in trafficking. Another case was heard via retrial procedures at the
request of the procuratorate (who apparently had failed to file an appeal on time). The court agreed
to increase a sentence from thirty months to thirty-six months for a recidivist defendant convicted of
stealing electric bicycles. Case I4b. The procuratorate's successful argument noted that the sentence
imposed in the lower court was below the range set forth in the criminal law.
270. In some locations procuratorates may also be required to file a certain number of kangsu
each year. Lin Shiyu (itt$), Jiancha Yewu Kaoping Jizhi Ying Fuhe Sifa Guilhiu

$6

(fjl
M4%
JIANCHA RIBAO (

SE

[ProcuratorialKaoping Should be Consistent with the Law],
K) [PROCURATORATE DAILY] (Nov. 23, 2008), http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2

006/2008-11-24/0003421232.html (China).
271.
Case 121. It is unclear why the procuratorate charged the defendant with willful injury
rather than homicide, although the fact that the defendant attacked the victim after the victim
harassed the defendant's daughter (forcing her to urinate in front of him) likely played a role.
272.
Cases 121b, 143b, and 197a (two separate defendants).
273.
Case 143b.
274. Case 197a. In this case, the court imposed a fine of 50,000 yuan. A codefendant, who
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Yet given the widespread portrayal of Chinese courts largely complying
with the procuracy in criminal cases, the four cases 275 in which the intermediate
court rejected the objection filed by the procuratorate were perhaps more
noteworthy. In one case, the procuratorate objected to a lower court's imposition
of a suspended sentence for a coal company official prosecuted for
misappropriating 100,000 yuan in public funds; the intermediate court affirmed
without a hearing, stating that the procuratorate lacked evidence to support its
argument. 276 Other cases in which the intermediate court refused a procuratorate
objection requesting a higher sentence involved the theft of a Tang Dynasty
Buddha, an intentional injury case arising out of a knife fight at a mahjong
game, 2 77 and a complex case in which the procuratorate and defendant both
appealed after a defendant was found guilty of misappropriation of public funds
and tax evasion. 278 In the final case, the procuratorate argued that the defendant
should have been convicted of the more serious crime of corruption. The
defendant had used public funds to start a company; he then returned the money
and sold the company. The defendant also appealed, arguing that the sentence
was too harsh because he had acted on the instruction of the company board. It
is difficult to draw any conclusions from the cases as to why the procuratorate
failed in these cases, in particular whether any of the defendants had particularly
strong cases or sources of external support that might have affected court
determinations.
Sixty-nine cases involved appeals by victims or their families. Although
victims may only appeal compensation awards, many victims contested both
compensation amounts and the sentence. 279 In three cases victims succeeded in
receiving additional compensation through an appellate court judgment.
Eight of the cases in my appellate dataset involved appellate review of a
case for at least the second time. Lawyers say such cases generally are those in
which courts have discovered problems with lower-court decisions but are
unwilling to issue a nonguilty verdict. 280 Some of the cases clearly represent
attempts to avoid decisions being classified as incorrect. Thus, for example, the

received a suspended sentence and a fine, likewise had his case remanded.
275.
Cases 113, I7b, 18e, and 120a.
276.
Case 113. In this case, the defendant also appealed, suggesting perhaps that the
procuratorate's objection was in part an effort to prevent a reduction in sentence.
277. The defendant had already compensated the victims, thus perhaps explaining the court's
reluctance to increase the sentence.
278.
Case 120A. In the original trial the defendant was sentenced to five years. The
procuratorate objected, the court vacated and remanded, and the trial court retried defendant and
imposed an eight year sentence. The procuratorate and defendant then both appealed. The defendant
argued that he was not guilty of misappropriation because he had acted on the instruction of the
company board. The procuratorate argued that that defendant had used public funds to start a
company and thus should have been convicted of the more serious crime of corruption.
279. See, e.g., Case 143b (vacating and remanding compensation award, but stating that the
court cannot reconsider the sentence).
280. Interview 2012-6.
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intermediate court twice remanded for retrial the conviction of the boss of a
State-owned hotel for abuse of power after he entered into an allegedly
unauthorized contract resulting in massive losses. In the third trial in the county
court the defendant was again convicted, but the court imposed no punishment.
In a third appeal the intermediate court affinned. 28 1 Other cases reflected
ongoing disputes concerning compensation; in one case in which the
compensation amount was the only issue in dispute, the court remanded the
same lower court decision three times. 282 In another case the appellate court
ordered that the lower court try a case for the fifth time, despite the fact that the
defendants had already served three-year sentences. 283 Other cases were
reopened many years after the conviction-including one for a defendant who
was convicted of fraud in 1983 and served an eight-year sentence. The
defendant, who never appealed the original sentence, apparently successfully
petitioned the provincial high court to order a rehearing. The intermediate court
did so but, applying the law of the 1980s, affirmed. 284
In one of the stranger cases in the dataset, a defendant originally arrested in
1990 on charges of intentional injury for an alleged killing in a fight fled after
being detained. He was eventually arrested in 2001 and then tried and acquitted
in 2002 by the trial court. The victim's family apparently appealed the attached
civil compensation case and the intermediate court ordered a retrial of both the
criminal judgment and the civil case, something it was not permitted to do
absent the initiation of formal rehearing procedures. By this point the defendant
had been found nonguilty and had skipped town. He was located in 2008,
eighteen years after the incident, and retried and sentenced to eight years. Both
the defendant and the procuratorate appealed, and the appellate court again
vacated and remanded. In 2010, twenty years after the alleged crime, the trial
court tried the defendant for a third time (and a codefendant for a second time)
and increased his sentence to nine years. On appeal for the third time the
intermediate court affirmed, with the primary defendant receiving a nine-year
285
sentence and the second defendant receiving a suspended sentence.
Judges estimate that they hear appeals in only ten percent of cases. 286 This
reflects that generally hearings are held on appeal only in cases involving an
objection filed by the procuratorate, where a hearing must be held, or in major

281. Case 126.
282. The third remand was because the lower court had impermissibly assigned the case on
retrial to the same three judges who initially tried it. Case 157. The reasons for the prior two remands
were unclear. See id.

283.
Three of
rehearing.
284.
285.
286.

Case 116a. The four retrials apparently came after repeated petitioning by the defendants.
the retrials came after successful appeals. One came after a successful petition for
Case 116b.
Case 186.
Interview 2012-19.
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cases. The data are consistent with such estimates: only eight percent of the
appeals indicated that the courts held hearings.
Defendant's arguments on appeal largely focused on leniency. The
inclusion of new evidence on appeal is rare; as one lawyer commented, "who
would dare to do it?," a reference to the risk of prosecution for fabricating
evidence. 2 87
G. Roles ofIndividualJudges
Participants in trials in the county court, not surprisingly, were repeat
players. In the county court a relatively small number of judges presided over
the overwhelming majority of cases. A total of seven judges and one people's
assessor heard all of the cases. 2 88 A single judge, sitting alone, tried 64
defendants and three-judge panels tried 169 cases. One judge participated, either
alone or as part of a panel, in the trials of 172 of the 273 defendants. Two of the
three judges were the same for 145 of the defendants. A people's assessor, who
is not considered a judge, sat on panels for 40 of the 273 defendants. The same
people's assessor was involved in all of these cases. The people's assessor
participated in many of the more serious crimes, perhaps reflecting an attempt to
suggest that the court was soliciting public input in such cases.
H. PredecisionDetention and Bail
The county court held 169 of the 273 defendants in pretrial detention at
some point, for periods ranging from 2 days to 369 days. The average detention
period, prior to a decision, was 39 days. But some defendants were held for
comparatively long periods prior to the decision. In four separate cases, 5
defendants were detained for 300 or more days prior to decision. All of these
cases involved relatively complex cases involving large amounts of money. The
issuance of false value added tax invoices and fraud or contract fraud.
Of the 273 defendants in the county court, 166 were granted bail, including
75 who were granted bail after initially being detained. Only 8 of the bailed
defendants eventually received nonsuspended criminal sentences. 289 This
suggests that the decision to grant bail is a strong predictor of whether or not a
defendant will face incarceration after trial. Of the remaining bailed defendants,
1 received no sentence or fine, but nevertheless was convicted; 39 received fines
but no criminal sentence; 290 51 received fines and a suspended sentence; and 67
287. Interview 2012-6.
288. People's assessors are laypeople, often former cadres or teachers, who are selected to hear
cases alongside judges in some cases.
289. Defendants in Cases B20 (two of three defendants), B62, B66 (three of eleven
defendants), B67, B69, and B128 all received nonsuspended sentences. One of the defendants in
Case B23 received a six-year sentence suspended for twelve months, making for an effective
sentence of five years.
290. Three of the fined defendants were also sentenced to public surveillance. Another was
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received a suspended sentence but no fine. Although the defendants that were
granted bail were charged with a wide range of crimes, the largest categories of
bailed defendants were those sentenced for traffic offenses, willful injury,
concealing criminal gains, and illegal logging. Although the court judgments do
not provide information regarding a defendant's residence, in interviews judges
note that only local residents receive bail. 29 1 Likewise, generally a defendant
must agree to compensate a victim as a prerequisite to being granted bail. 292
Not surprisingly, defendants in cases appealed to or tried in the
intermediate court were generally detained far longer. 293 Defendants in firstinstance trials, for which data were available, averaged 367 days in detention
prior to decision. Defendants in appeals were detained for shorter periods-215
days-but nevertheless far longer than defendants in the county court.
Defendants whose cases were on review in the intermediate court for the second
time, or for more than the second time, were detained for an average of 411
days. 294

III.
IMPLICATIONS AND ANALYSIS

The empirical analysis presented above provides insights into criminal
justice in China that was largely missing from prior scholarship. This section
discusses the implications of the above analysis in four areas of empirical and
theoretical literature.
A. Methodology and EmpiricalFindings
Many of this article's findings will not be surprising to scholars familiar
with the Chinese legal system. Scholars are widely aware of the lack of lawyers,
prevalence of confessions, and near impossibility of winning a nonguilty verdict
in China. Nevertheless, this study offers some of the first empirical evidence of
just how widespread such phenomena continue to be. This article confirms
findings that have been based on observational studies of and interviews in
courts, or based on research conducted prior to the recent reemphasis on
populism in China's legal system. The lack of access to earlier cases makes it
impossible to compare 2010 to prior years. Qualitative evidence from
interviews, however, suggests that such problems persist even as China embarks
sentenced to public surveillance but then had the sentence suspended.
291. Interview 2013-11.
292. Id.
293. The intermediate court cases did not always include complete information on detention
periods, in particular for cases on appeal. As a result, these figures may not be representative. The
cases provide data on predecision detention periods for 56 of the 73 first-instance defendants, 223 of
the 452 defendants on appeal, and 13 of the 21 defendants in cases heard in rehearing procedures.
Defendants in rehearing procedures on average had been detained for 243 days.
294. The cases provide information on six of the eight defendants in such cases.

http://scholarship.1aw.berkeley.edu/bjil/vo133/iSS1/1

216

: Full Issue 33:1

212

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:1

on its most important criminal-justice-system reforms in more than fifteen years
with the enactment and implementation of the 2012 revisions to the Criminal
Procedure Law. 295 Likewise, the lack of access to prior decisions makes it
difficult to determine to what degree making opinions public affects the quality
and substance of court decisions. Nevertheless, this study offers a baseline
against which future developments can be measured. The data also provide a
narrative of ordinary criminal justice in rural China as well as insight into
institutional dynamics within the criminal justice system.
Some of the discussed data, however, are surprising. Recent literature has
described the policy of balancing leniency and severity or has focused on
specific cases of individuals purchasing leniency by compensating victims. Prior
literature has neglected how leniency is manifest across a range of cases.
Evidence from court decisions and from interviews with lawyers and judges
suggests that settlement and compensation to victims are playing far greater
roles in the criminal justice system than previously recognized in routine
criminal matters and in serious cases. 296 I lack access to capital cases, and thus
am unable to observe the most serious cases that most often do not receive
leniency. Yet, it is clear that in a wide range of cases leniency in the wake of
confessions and settlement is a common incentive to efficiently resolve criminal
matters. The scope of the use of suspended sentences in the county court and the
apparent use of settlement to reduce sentences in cases tried in the intermediate
court at the very least represent a liberal interpretation of the SPC's guidelines.
This Article's findings thus challenge common Western assumptions about
the Chinese criminal justice system, in particular the focus on heavy
punishments. The findings provide empirical support for those in China who
argue that wealth is becoming a key determinant in criminal sentencing. I do not
claim that the system is always lenient; the system can treat defendants
extraordinarily harshly, in particular when the State considers its interests
threatened. A decision that appears lenient may in fact be excessive if it results
from court doubts about the guilt of the defendant. The cases also manifest a
strong State interest in maintaining control by criminalizing minor disputes or
those that present a threat to social stability. But my findings suggest that more
attention should be paid to developments in routine cases and that leniency is
used even in some serious cases.

295. Participants at workshops in China and interviewees noted that some recent legal changes
are already having a significant effect, most notably amendments to the Criminal Law in 2010 that
mandate a term of detention for defendants convicted of drunk driving and also heightened focus on
official corruption in the wake of China's 2012 leadership transition. Interview 2013-8; Interview
2013-9; Criminal Law, supranote 89, art. 133(a).
296. For example, McConville's important study found that only eleven percent of defendants
in basic court cases received noncustodial sentences. MCCONVILLE, supra note 3, at 363-64. One
earlier study found that eighty-four percent of defendants received a prison sentence and that sixtyfour percent received a sentence in excess of five years. Hong Lu & Terance D. Miethe, Confessions
and Criminal Case Disposition in China, 37 LAW & Soc'y REv. 549, 571 (2003).
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This Article also makes the methodological claim that there is significant
value in studying the vast volume of routine cases now publicly available in
China. I am well aware of the limitations of my data and of the risks of Western
scholars over-relying on court opinions. Numerous cases in this Article leave
one to speculate regarding likely machinations at work behind the scenes. The
ability to read the entire case files would certainly add to our understanding of
how courts process criminal cases. Scholars in China are now doing some work
in this area. 2 97 But the cases available in Henan provide a new window into the
practice of justice in China, one that has yet to be explored in depth by scholars
in China or elsewhere. The hundreds of thousands of cases available are a
massive untapped resource for scholars, both for learning what is actually going
on in the Chinese legal system and for mapping out future lines of scholarly
inquiry. Most prior scholarship on China's courts, including my own, relies
heavily on either what judges say they do or on cases selected for researchers by
judges. The widespread availability of large numbers of opinions allows us to
compare what judges say they do with what actually happens.
More can be done with the data presented in this article. Future work will
include more sophisticated quantitative analysis and also more detailed analysis
of particular types of cases. It is now possible to examine issues such as the
effect of lawyers on outcomes in criminal cases and perhaps the role of
individual judges. Related projects based on this study are likely to include a
more detailed analysis of how judges interpret and adapt national laws, judicial
interpretations, and policy guidelines; analysis of how courts process a wide
range of financial crimes, including corruption; the use of nondeath sentences
for homicide; the impact of the relationship among victims and defendants on
outcomes; the role and meaning of confession; the role of appellate review and
whether certain types of cases are more likely to succeed on appeal; and
potentially the impact of gender and family relations on the criminal justice
system.
B. Leniency and the Roles of Chinese CriminalLaw
As noted above, the definition of leniency is contested in China. Leniency
in sentencing in China can be manifest through formal law, judicial policy, and
actual practice. Chinese law and court guidelines provide technical answers to
when and how courts should act leniently, setting forth conditions under which a
defendant may have a sentence reduced or may receive a suspended sentence.
My analysis suggests another definition, focusing on when individuals are able
to avoid jail time, in relatively minor cases, or avoid death, in more serious
cases.

297. McConville's study also relied in part on analysis of case files conducted by members of
his research team. MCCONVILLE, supra note 3, at 363-64.
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It is counterintuitive to discuss leniency when referring to a system with
virtually no chance of acquittal at trial and in which wrongful convictions are
common. Not everyone receives leniency, and victims play an important role in
determining whether leniency is granted. Nevertheless, policy and practice in
Henan suggest that many defendants are receiving sentences that are lower than
what is likely or even possible under formal legal rules and might otherwise be
expected. My claim that courts are surprisingly lenient should be understood
narrowly to state that the data show a surprisingly large number of cases
(compared to popular and scholarly expectations) 298 in which defendants
receive only suspended sentences or receive life or suspended death sentences
for murder.
The practice of leniency also provides insight into the goals of the Chinese
criminal justice system. The evidence presented in this Article suggests that the
policy of leniency is not being used to protect defendants' rights or to further an
interest in restorative justice. In contrast to most models of restorative justice,
negotiations between victims and defendants appear to influence charging
decisions and court determinations regarding guilt. Courts place extreme
pressure on the parties to reach negotiated outcomes, often guiding the parties to
such outcomes, and reconciliation focuses overwhelmingly on financial
payments. Negotiations in China take place in the context of a system that has
no real mechanism for protecting the rights of defendants and in which money
and stability concerns play a large role in determining outcomes.
Resource concerns are one factor leading to greater use of suspended
sentences. China has seen a significant increase in the number of criminal cases
in the past decade, from 656,788 in 2000 to 884,737 in 2010.299 The growth in
cases makes continuation of "strike hard" policies both impracticable and also
perhaps risky. Such policies risk alienating a widening segment of the
population. Yet resource concerns do not appear to be a main factor. Instead, the
primary goals in embracing leniency are to maintain State legitimacy, ensure
social stability, insulate the courts from criticism, and protect individual judges
from responsibility for potentially incorrect decisions. In interviews, judges

298. In discussing this project with numerous distinguished Chinese criminal justice scholars, I
have been struck that virtually all have been surprised at the prevalence of suspended sentences in
routine cases. Likewise, participants at presentations of this paper in China expressed surprise; one
judge stated that my findings were "impossible." Yet the findings were also confirmed with judges
in county B, one of whom stated that nonpublic juvenile cases would show even more surprising
levels of leniency. Interview 2013-9. It is clear there is widespread variation in the frequency with
which suspended sentences are granted, both within Henan and nationwide. Data are difficult to
obtain. One workshop participant estimated that suspended-sentence rates in one major city in Henan
would not exceed thirty percent. There has been less surprise at my finding that compensation can
make a difference between life and death in more serious cases.
299.
See ZHONGGUO FALD NIANJIAN (2001) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA (2001)] 1256, 1258;
ZHONGGUO FAL NIANJIAN (2011) [LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA (2011)] 1051, 1053.
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repeatedly noted that mediated and settled cases are much less likely to result in
petitions, protests, or appeals than are ordinary criminal matters. 300
The strong emphasis on compromise in the cases also suggests that courts
are focused less on the legal correctness of their decisions than on ensuring
cases be resolved. Evidence from Henan suggests that courts' jobs today focus
less on determining the guilt of the defendant and more on preventing social
instability. Trials determine only sentences, not guilt. The cases reviewed also
demonstrate that procurators and courts have extreme discretion when it comes
to bringing charges and imposing sentences. 30 1 Although there is a technical
legal basis for most lenient (and harsh) outcomes, the cases show just how wide
this discretion can be in determining the crime charged, as demonstrated in the
corruption and financial crime cases, and the sentences imposed. 302 Efforts to
make the criminal justice system more rule-based are in tension with the
extensive discretion that judges and procurators possess. Yet, this discretion is
an important tool for encouraging negotiated outcomes. Whether the
inconsistency that results from such discretion poses a challenge to the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system remains to be seen.
It is also clear from the data that the criminal justice system is not serving
the interests of the State alone. In contrast with the traditional characterization of
people in rural China avoiding contact with the formal legal system, my data
suggest it has become routine for the criminal system to be utilized to settle
disputes among strangers (traffic accidents) and among neighbors and family
(fights). The large number of what appears to be primarily tort disputes reflects
the weakness of the tort system. Litigants, prosecutors, and judges use criminal
charges strategically to force settlements or to ensure that tort judgments are
paid. There is also evidence that the criminal system is being used to settle
scores, in particular in the context of financial crimes. Evidence from Henan
suggests that much of the victims' rights discourse that dominates discussions of
criminal settlement in China may be glossing over the potential use of the
criminal system for personal animus. This is made possible by the fostering of

300.
China is certainly not the only system that treats a large range of defendants leniently;
Japan's incarceration rates are also very low. Routine cases in many U.S. jurisdictions likely would
appear lenient to many outside observers. Nor is China the only place in which bargaining is a key
aspect of the resolution of criminal disputes, although parallels to plea bargaining (and the resulting
low number of nonguilty verdicts) in the United States should not be overstated. Negotiations in
China rarely include lawyers, and victims have extraordinary power in the process. China has
undergone a shift from a traditional authoritarian law-and-order approach to criminal cases; as
recently as eighteen years ago it was possible for defendants to be executed for theft. Yet it also
seems clear that the Chinese system is not converging toward either the Japanese model or Western
liberal systems that put heavy emphasis on procedure.
301. The fact that procurators face incentives to obtain convictions, but not to achieve specific
sentences, also encourages flexibility and leniency.
302. Prosecutors elsewhere, including the United States, often have extensive discretion in
changing decisions. In China, however, such discretion is exercised with little or no subsequent
oversight from the courts.
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direct negotiations between the parties prior to a court hearing a case. One key
question that the cases raise, but do not answer, is why traditional communitybased institutions for dispute resolution do not function. Another is whether the
desirability of a system that relies so heavily on settlement varies depending on
the crime charged. For example, whether there is a difference between an
emphasis on settlement in traffic and fight cases compared to corruption cases.
The emphasis on mediated outcomes may reflect both China's legal history
and also changes in contemporary Chinese society. Aspects of the practice have
clear historical antecedents. 303 At the same time, however, the heavy emphasis
on settlement may reflect trends in contemporary Chinese society. All of
Chinese society has become an exchange, in which money and personal
relationships dominate outcomes.
The evidence presented in this Article represents a modest first step toward
creating a theory of the practice of ordinary criminal law in China. The State
continues to focus on law and order as a mechanism for maintaining legitimacy
and for maintaining control. This is evidenced by the heavy punishments in
cases affecting State interests and the extreme discretion placed in the hands of
police and procurators. Yet the data in this Article also suggest other themes that
appear to be increasingly important in criminal cases in China. Such values
include repairing social ties; maintaining social harmony; and ensuring
compensation to victims, in particular those who have lost a key breadwinner in
a society lacking a social safety network. 30 4 The Chinese system also provides
minor criminals with a second and final chance; reinforces communal nonns,
even when those norms are in tension with formal law (as appears to be the case
in family disputes and the one bigamy case); and introduces elements of
collective punishment by ensuring that family members and neighbors bear the
financial cost of crime. 30 5
China appears to be shifting toward a bifurcated criminal justice system.
Routine cases are resolved through negotiated outcomes and suspended or result
in short sentences, while more serious cases result in long sentences. A key
insight from the data presented in this Article is that defendants may wind up in
the second category not only because of the seriousness of their crime but also
because of their inability to settle or the victims' unwillingness to settle. The
data also make clear that there is significant randomness with regards to who
gets punished and how much punishment they receive. Flexibility on the part of

303. Involving another person in the legal system was a common means of retaliation in
traditional China. The use of money to reduce sentences was also common. Because China's
imperial legal system did not distinguish between civil and criminal disputes, it was also common to
see disputes that today might be classified as civil disputes being resolved through the use of
criminal sanctions.
304. As one lawyers noted, the system may make sense for China given that victims generally
lack resources and can be financially crippled by the loss ofa breadwinner. Interview 2013-2.
305. In rural areas it is common for family members of defendants to rely on neighbors to
come up with the money necessary to pay a settlement. Interview 2013-2.
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procurators and police and the apparent randomness of outcomes may further
State interests in social control by sending a message that all are subject to the
State's power.
Most debate within China focuses on technical issues directly linked to
specific reforms: eliminating torture, increasing access to lawyers, and forcing
appellate courts to decide cases before them when they find problems (not
simply engaging in repeated cycles of vacating and remanding problematic
decisions). The cases described above, however, suggest that more fundamental
issues, concerning the core goals of Chinese criminal law, are contested as well.
Understanding the reality of every day criminal justice in China provides a first
step to conceptualizing the goals of Chinese criminal justice. Evidence from
Henan suggests that the focus of Chinese criminal law in China has shifted away
from a focus on incarceration and control. The criminal system today mixes
emphasis on legal principles with quick resolution of disputes, compensation for
victims, observance of community nonns, and reliance on high levels of
discretion by decision makers.
C. The (D) evolving Roles of China's Courts
This Article's findings also contribute to literature on the role of China's
courts and the evolution of institutions in an authoritarian system in which
stability is prioritized above all else. The observation that courts are innovating
and adopting flexible practices not entirely consistent with formal laws in order
to minimize discontent and insulate themselves from criticism is not unique to
criminal cases. 306 I have recently written of a similar phenomenon in medical
disputes, 307 and other scholars have noted similar trends in other areas. Recent
scholarship notes the emphasis on mediation in recent years in civil cases and
the focus in the courts on anjie, shiliao-deciding the case and resolving the
dispute. 308 Henan's bar to posting mediated cases online provides an additional
incentive for courts to mediate cases, as judges know such cases will not be
publicly scrutinized.
The trends this Article describes in Henan show how such policies have
extended to criminal cases. Authorities believe that mediating or compelling
settlements in criminal disputes will reduce threats to social stability, most
significantly the threat of protest or petitioning. 309 Specifically, mediated
outcomes prevent victims (or their families) from protesting sentences they view

306. In some jurisdictions in China judges may be evaluated both on whether or not a decision
is reversed or vacated and also on whether or not there is an appeal at all.
307.
Benjamin L. Liebman, Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2013).

308.
309.

Liebman, supra note 9; Minzner, supra note 8.
For a more detailed discussion of stability concerns, see Benjamin Liebman, Legal

Reform: China'sLaw-Stability Paradox,DAEDALUS, Spring 2014, at 96.
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as too light and prevent defendants' families from objecting to sentences viewed
as excessive.
In contrast with the social worker model of adjudication emphasized in
literature in the United States, however, the primary concern of China's courts
appears to be problem elimination, not problem solving. Hence, courts appear
not only to compel settlement, but also to implicitly and explicitly threaten those
who do not comply with such settlements, as evidenced by cases that target
repeat petitioners. The State is also taking an active role in resolving what we
might otherwise think of as private, civil disputes that appear to indirectly affect
State interests. Resolution of such cases appears to be based less on efforts to
meet social expectations or impose community nonns, and more on a functional
focus on eliminating disputes.
China appears to be seeking to use courts to create a "no loser" model,
where the focus on outcomes, not procedure (or law), leads all parties to accept
negotiated outcomes. In this system, failure to do so is an indication that courts
are not doing their job. The conflict between this approach and the adoption of a
rule-based system has been widely noted in China, with many arguing that such
moves undermine China's efforts to construct a legal system.
The encouragement of State-mediated (or coerced) settlements may be
particularly troubling in the criminal sphere. The promotion of negotiated
outcomes marks a sharp departure from recent efforts to create a more
adversarial system. The emphasis on settlement introduces a new element of
coercion into the system. 3 10 The focus on negotiated outcomes reinforces the
fact that courts are not a forum for determining guilt.
Equity concerns are also readily apparent. Although most criticism of
China's embrace of settlement and mediation in the criminal context has focused
on serious crimes-where defendants in effect purchase their life 31 1-my data
suggest similar concerns in the imposition of sentences in routine cases. This
Article shows not only that some defendants are receiving strikingly lenient
sentences but also that defendants who either refuse or lack the ability to pay
may be punished harshly. Whether negotiated outcomes actually produce
stability is unclear. Criminal cases continue to be a primary source of complaints
concerning the courts, in particular from victims' families' reported concern that
defendants will avoid punishment through back-room deals.
The data also show that courts are willing to assert their authority in some
cases. One of the most surprising findings is the high rate of reversal or changes
to decisions on appeal to the intermediate court. This rate is much higher than
generally understood to be the case within the legal community or rates reported
in most prior research and in the official media. Yet this high rate of reversal is
not limited to this one court or to criminal cases; I have also noted a high rate of

310. Rosenzweig et al. report similar findings and provide additional details regarding the
coercive nature of criminal mediation. Rosenzweig et al., supra note 102, at 29-3 1.
311. For example, see Lewis, supra note 85, at 329, discussing equity concerns in capital cases.
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3 12
Some of
reversal in medical malpractice cases in courts elsewhere in China.
the changes and reversals almost certainly reflect attempts to appease particular
parties, or to encourage further settlement. But it also seems clear that the
intermediate court is taking its role in reviewing cases seriously. In some cases,
institutional relationships and the fear of a case being labeled an error result in a
dynamic in which the appellate and basic-level courts are locked in a standoff.
Cases are remanded only to have lower courts issue the same or a similar
decision at retrial. This finding contrasts with those who have argued that
appellate review in China has little effect, or that higher courts are generally
unwilling to reverse lower court decisions because of the impact such decisions
have on the career development of judges below. Likewise, the cases show that
courts, in certain cases, will challenge and reject procuratorate determinations or
arguments on appeal. Imposing lenient sentences may also allow courts to
disagree with procuratorates without issuing a nonguilty verdict. Increased
oversight over the courts appears to be making judges more careful and less
willing to sign off on clearly incorrect cases.

Future research will provide insight into the interplay between the adoption
of formal law (the revised Criminal Procedure Law) and new procedural
requirements and continued concerns about stability and emphasis on settling
cases. The new law should in theory result in numerous changes readily
apparent in case decisions. Procurators are now required to attend all trials,
something clearly not done in many cases handled via summary procedures in
my dataset. Appellate courts will be required to decide more cases on appeal (as
opposed to remanding them). Additionally, witnesses should begin to attend
trials. Many of these provisions in the new law are based on the assumption that
the system is shifting toward an adversarial model of adjudication and impartial
determination of guilt by judges. The evidence presented in this Article shows
how far the current reality is from this model, and thus highlights the challenges
facing attempts to implement the new law.
Henan's experiment with judicial transparency also provides insight into
innovation in China's courts. Henan's reforms have resulted in part from
attempts to address widely publicized egregious cases of injustice. They also
reflect the personal goals of Zhang Liyong, the president of the Henan High
People's Court. Innovation has helped to boost Zhang's profile. It remains to be
seen to what degree his reforms will outlive his time on the court. Henan's
innovations, the most important in China's courts in the past decade, were not
designed to increase judicial power. Innovative steps were part of an attempt to
make the courts function more efficiently and make fewer errors, and in so
doing win greater popular support. Legitimacy for the courts does appear to be a
goal, but it is legitimacy rooted in meeting popular expectations, avoiding
instability, and serving the interests of the State.

312.

Liebman, supra note 307, at 220.
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The fact that judges in China play roles different from those played by their
Western counterparts has long been observed in academic literature, as has the
growing tension between judges' own aspirations regarding their roles and the
actual roles they play. I have argued elsewhere that many of the roles being
played by Chinese courts today represent a continuation of revolutionary and
prerevolution tradition rather than a shift against efforts to build some form of
liberal rule-of-law system. This Article shows how these trends manifest
themselves in the criminal justice system, where judges balance efforts to
resolve disputes with their own self-interest in avoiding responsibility for
mistakes. The cases studied also provide insight into the roles lawyers play in
such a system, with most focusing on technical arguments for leniency and on
facilitating negotiated outcomes. Substantive arguments not relating to leniency
are almost entirely unsuccessful. The cases thus provide an initial window into
an as yet understudied topic: the role of lawyers in a system in which compelled
mediation is dominant.
D. AuthoritarianTransparency
Finally, this project also adds to literature about the role of transparency in
the Chinese political system and authoritarian systems more generally. In some
respects, the courts in Henan today are the most transparent in China. 313 Yet this
transparency has very specific goals: controlling judges, reducing errors, and, in
so doing, increasing public confidence in the courts. The fact that so much
continues to go on behind the scenes makes the efficacy of such efforts at the
very least questionable. 3 14 Most notably, however, is the parallel to other areas
in which the State has similarly embraced an instrumentalist view of
transparency. Such areas include the adoption of freedom-of-information
regulations and the "controlled transparency" model of media supervision of the
legal system. 3 15 Absent from discussion of the Henan policy of making cases
available online is concern with citizens' right to know. Likewise, discussion of
the policy does not focus on the possibility that making vast amounts of
information publicly available may also play a role in furthering the
development of the Chinese legal system. Instead, official discussion focuses
almost entirely on the need to ensure judges obey the rules.
Henan's experiment with judicial openness highlights three characteristics
of China's emerging model of authoritarian transparency. First, transparency is
targeted, and it is applied to limited areas and with specific constraints. This is

313. Publication of cases is not the only possible metric of judicial transparency: the cases tell
us little about whether trials were actually open to the public.
314. For example, the Henan cases provide no insight into the rule of court adjudication
committees or Party Political legal committees. For a discussion of the general functioning of the
courts, see Benjamin Liebman, China'sCourts: RestrictedReform, 191 CHINA Q. 633 (2007).
315.

Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System,

105 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 125 (2005).
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evident from the limitations on publication of a range of types of cases, arguably
some of which would provide the best window into courts' performance in the
most difficult cases. Second, transparency appears to be directed mainly at
curbing official wrongdoing, not empowering individuals. This is true both in
the courts and in media coverage of official corruption. Third, appeals to
transparency are combined with appeals to populism. As Zhang Liyong noted,
putting cases online is intended to subject judges to scrutiny by the online
masses. Transparency is aimed at scaring judges into better performance and
creating a platform for State oversight, with populism playing a functional role
in supporting such goals.
Henan's experiment is of particular relevance now, as the SPC seeks to
encourage and require courts nationwide to place decisions online. Yet the
SPC's new rules also highlight some of the apparent uncertainty among court
and Party-State leaders about the utility of transparency. The SPC rules will
require the Henan courts to make some decisions publicly available that were
not previously made available under Henan's own rules on publication of court
documents. Yet in one crucial respect the SPC rules will reduce transparency in
Henan. 3 16 The SPC rules state that court decisions may only be posted online
when case decisions are "effective"-meaning either that the time period for
filing an appeal has passed, or an appellate court has decided the case. 3 17 Prior
to the SPC rules, Henan required publication of first-instance decisions even
when they were pending on appeal. 318 Henan court officials note that this is no
longer permitted. The ban on publication of decisions on appeal suggests
discomfort with the possibility of public scrutiny of pending cases. Scrutiny is
permitted only once courts have reached a definitive outcome. Transparency is
being used for specific purposes, but is also being controlled.
The near-daily corruption scandals in China in the past two years show that
increased transparency and public scrutiny are not easily contained. New
technologies are combining with increased focus by the State on attacking
corruption to provide fertile ground for individuals and activists alike to expose
wrongdoing. Yet this dynamic supports, rather than undermines, this model of
authoritarian transparency, in significant part because such efforts are not rule
(or law) based. Those who are exposed receive little in the way of legal process,
and those not exposed fear online exposure or popular reaction rather than
sustained compliance with legal rules. There is value in increased transparency
in the Chinese system, but there is also danger in mistaking such steps with
fundamental change in how the system functions. Transparency may be a virtue,
but it is also a tool of control.
316. Interview 2014-1 (stating that "less will be made public under [the] SPC rules" than had
previously been the case in Henan).
317.
See sections 2, 4, and 8 of Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Issuance of
Judgments on the Internet by the People's Courts, supra note 5.
318. Implementing Rules, supra note 13, arts. 3, 5, 6 (stating that all first-instance cases,
except for those specifically excluded, shall be placed online).
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CONCLUSION

This Article is a first step in taking advantage of the vast amount of data
now available to scholars of Chinese law regarding court decisions. This Article
is also an initial step toward conceptualizing what such data mean for our
understanding of the Chinese criminal justice system and for broader trends in
the Chinese political-legal system. What remains most surprising is that such
research is now possible, in large part due to Party-State interests in asserting
oversight over China's courts.
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